Decision making in supply risk and supply disruption management by Merath, Maximilian
  
 
 
 
 
DECISION MAKING 
IN SUPPLY RISK AND 
SUPPLY DISRUPTION MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inauguraldissertation 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften 
der Universität Mannheim 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
Maximilian Merath 
Mannheim  
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dekan:  Prof. Dr. Dieter Truxius 
 
Referent:  Prof. Dr. Christoph Bode 
 
Korreferentin: Prof. Dr. Laura Marie Edinger-Schons 
 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 7. Dezember 2018
iii 
Acknowledgements 
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. 
Christoph Bode. Christoph taught me everything I needed to know about conducting 
research and presenting one’s work in an adequate fashion. He provided valuable 
feedback and guidance throughout the time I spent at his Chair. Most importantly, I highly 
appreciate the positive and goal-oriented working atmosphere Christoph established right 
from the beginning. This fostered productivity and progress regarding my work on the 
dissertation. Moreover, I could always rely on Christoph regarding issues that extended 
beyond the usual work-related matters. 
Special thanks go to my colleagues, especially Michael Westerburg and Sebastian 
Gehrlein, for valuable discussions, fun lunch breaks, and the distractions from the daily 
work. In addition, I would like to thank and Helke Naujok and Judith Fuhrmann. 
Furthermore, I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my parents, Esther and Franz, my 
fiancée, Danica, and my brother, Janosch. I could always rely on their support and 
suggestions.  
Finally, an exciting part of the time I spent working on the dissertation has been 
made possible by John R. Macdonald and Lynn M. Shore who invited me to Colorado 
State University (Fort Collins, Colorado). John provided excellent advice on chapter 2 of 
this dissertation and played a decisive role in making my stay in Fort Collins a great 
experience.  
iv 
Contents 
List of figures ............................................................................................. vii 
List of tables .............................................................................................. viii 
List of abbreviations .................................................................................. ix 
Chapter 1 Introduction and research overview ....................................... 1 
1.1 Motivation ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research questions ........................................................................................... 2 
1.2.1 Research question 1: Supply risk management ...................................... 3 
1.2.2 Research question 2: The influence of supply risk management on the 
impact of disruptions .............................................................................. 4 
1.2.3 Research question 3: Supply disruption management ............................ 6 
Chapter 2 Supply disruptions and protection motivation: Why some 
managers act proactively (and others don’t) ......................... 8 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 9 
2.2 Protection motivation theory and propositions ........................................... 10 
2.2.1 Coping appraisal ................................................................................... 13 
2.2.2 Threat appraisal ..................................................................................... 13 
2.2.3 Individual characteristics ...................................................................... 15 
2.3 Methodology .................................................................................................... 16 
2.3.1 Experimental design ............................................................................. 17 
2.3.2 Study participants ................................................................................. 20 
2.4 Results .............................................................................................................. 23 
2.4.1 Estimation strategy ............................................................................... 23 
2.4.2 Model estimation .................................................................................. 25 
2.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................ 28 
2.5.1 Theoretical implications ....................................................................... 29 
2.5.2 Managerial implications ....................................................................... 31 
2.5.3 Limitations and future research opportunities ...................................... 32 
v 
Chapter 3 Substantive and symbolic corporate social responsibility: 
Blessing or curse in case of misconduct? .............................. 34 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 35 
3.2 Conceptual background and hypotheses development ............................... 36 
3.2.1 Substantive and symbolic management of corporate social 
responsibility expectations .................................................................... 36 
3.2.2 Corporate social irresponsibility ........................................................... 39 
3.2.3 Assimilation and contrast effects subsequent to CSIR ......................... 41 
3.3 Method ............................................................................................................. 44 
3.3.1 Development of vignettes and experimental design ............................. 45 
3.3.2 Study participants ................................................................................. 48 
3.3.3 Measures ............................................................................................... 48 
3.3.4 Manipulation checks ............................................................................. 50 
3.4 Results .............................................................................................................. 51 
3.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................ 54 
3.5.1 Theoretical implications ....................................................................... 54 
3.5.2 Managerial implications ....................................................................... 57 
3.5.3 Limitations and future research opportunities ...................................... 58 
Chapter 4 Supply disruption management: The early bird catches the 
worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese? ...................... 61 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 62 
4.2 Supply disruption management and resilience ............................................ 63 
4.3 How managers should behave in supply disruption response situations .. 65 
4.3.1 A model of supply disruption recovery ................................................ 65 
4.3.2 The environment ................................................................................... 66 
4.3.3 Organizational adaptation to environmental change ............................ 67 
4.3.4 Supply disruptions and uncertainty ....................................................... 68 
4.3.5 Disruption response strategies .............................................................. 69 
4.3.6 Path dependence ................................................................................... 72 
4.3.7 Results ................................................................................................... 73 
4.3.8 Robustness of simulation results ........................................................... 80 
4.3.9 Discussion ............................................................................................. 81 
4.4 How managers actually intend to behave in supply disruption response 
situations .......................................................................................................... 82 
vi 
4.4.1 Development of the vignettes ............................................................... 83 
4.4.2 Study participants ................................................................................. 85 
4.4.3 Dependent variable ............................................................................... 85 
4.4.4 Manipulation checks ............................................................................. 85 
4.4.5 Results ................................................................................................... 86 
4.4.6 Discussion ............................................................................................. 88 
4.5 General discussion .......................................................................................... 89 
4.5.1 Implications for research ...................................................................... 89 
4.5.2 Implications for practice ....................................................................... 91 
4.5.3 Limitations and future research opportunities ...................................... 92 
Chapter 5 Conclusion and future research directions .......................... 94 
5.1 Summary ......................................................................................................... 94 
5.1.1 Research question 1: Supply risk management .................................... 94 
5.1.2 Research question 2: The influence of supply risk management on the 
impact of disruptions ............................................................................ 96 
5.1.3 Research question 3: Supply disruption management .......................... 97 
5.2 Limitations ...................................................................................................... 98 
5.3 Outlook ............................................................................................................ 99 
References ................................................................................................ 101 
Curriculum vitae ..................................................................................... 120 
 
  
vii 
List of figures 
Figure 1: Overview of research questions ....................................................................... 3 
Figure 2: Overall model of protection motivation theory (based on Rogers (1983)) .... 12 
Figure 3: Relative importance of DCE response alternative variables .......................... 27 
Figure 4: Perceived relative importance of DCE response alternative variables ........... 28 
Figure 5: Enriched model of protection motivation theory ........................................... 30 
Figure 6: Interaction effect of CSR reputation and CSIR severity ................................ 53 
Figure 7: Typical supply disruption profile ................................................................... 64 
Figure 8: An individual simulation run .......................................................................... 71 
Figure 9: Summary of results ......................................................................................... 75 
Figure 10: Post-disruption performance (PDP) ............................................................. 76 
Figure 11: Final performance (FP) ................................................................................ 78 
Figure 12: Uncertainty resolution performance (URP) ................................................. 79 
Figure 13: Number of time periods required to reach long-term configuration (NTP) . 80 
Figure 14: The effects of response uncertainty, complexity, and path dependence on 
ITA ............................................................................................................... 88 
  
viii 
List of tables 
Table 1: Scenario descriptions ....................................................................................... 19 
Table 2: Attribute level descriptions .............................................................................. 20 
Table 3: Multi-item measurement scales ....................................................................... 22 
Table 4: Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics ............................................... 22 
Table 5: Estimated MNL models ................................................................................... 26 
Table 6: Vignette module text descriptions ................................................................... 47 
Table 7: Frequencies, cell means, standard distributions, and correlation for the 
dependent variables ......................................................................................... 51 
Table 8: ANOVA results with purchase intention (PI) as dependent variable .............. 51 
Table 9: ANOVA results with intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth (nWOM) 
as dependent variable ....................................................................................... 52 
Table 10: Summary of hypotheses and results ............................................................... 53 
Table 11: Parameter values determining the experimental conditions .......................... 74 
Table 12: Frequencies, cell means, and standard distributions for ITA ......................... 87 
Table 13: ANOVA results .............................................................................................. 87 
Table 14: Summary of propositions ............................................................................... 90 
  
ix 
List of abbreviations 
ANCOVA Analysis of covariance 
ANOVA Analysis of variance 
AVE Average variance extracted 
BP British Petroleum 
B2B Business-to-business 
B2C Business-to-consumer 
CFA Confirmatory factor analysis 
CFI Comparative fit index 
CI Confidence interval 
CSIR Corporate social irresponsibility 
CSR Corporate social responsibility 
DCE Discrete choice experiment 
df Degrees of freedom 
DICO Direct implementation costs 
ESG Environmental, social, and governance 
FP Final performance 
IPT Information-processing theory 
ITA Intention to take immediate action 
KPI Key performance indicator 
M Mean 
MNL Multinomial logit 
MS Mean square 
NL Nested logit 
NTP Number of time periods 
nWOM Negative word-of-mouth 
PDP Post-disruption performance 
PI Purchase intention 
PMT Protection motivation theory 
RAF Ready-aim-fire 
RECO Response costs 
REFF Response efficacy 
RFA Ready-fire-aim 
RMSEA Root mean square error of approximation 
SD Standard deviation 
SE Standard error 
SEFF Self-efficacy 
SLO Social license to operate 
SRMR Standardized root mean square residual 
SS Sum of squares 
TLI Tucker-Lewis index (also NNFI) 
URP Uncertainty resolution performance 
VULN Vulnerability 
VW Volkswagen 
 
Introduction and research overview  1 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction and research overview 
1.1 Motivation 
“The ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and 
convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy.” 
– Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Supply chains are exposed to a myriad of risks that pose considerable challenges to 
managers. In case a risk materializes and creates a subsequent disruption, the potential 
negative consequences are devastating. Recent developments foster the vulnerability of 
firms to suffer from supply chain risks and add considerable relevance to the threat of 
being severely harmed by them. First, modern supply chains have become more complex 
and interconnected due to globalization and intensified competition (Bode & Wagner, 
2015; Business Continuity Institute, 2016). Second, many supply chain management 
initiatives that appear to provide enhanced efficiency or responsiveness in stable 
environments turn out to be a burden for firms in turbulent ones (Norrman & Jansson, 
2004). Third, the pressure that stakeholders can exert on firms to comply with ethical 
standards and commit to environmental and social values, especially by holding them 
accountable for misconduct within their supply chains, has grown (Hartmann & Moeller, 
2014). Finally, not only the frequency of natural catastrophes but also their intensity has 
increased (Munich Re, 2017). 
Prior research has shown that supply chain disruptions tend to be “more critical 
when they occur upstream in the chain” (Pereira, Christopher, & Lago Da Silva, 2014, p. 
627). Hence, this dissertation research focuses on upstream supply chain risks (hereafter: 
Supply risks) and disruptions (hereafter: Supply disruptions). To manage a firm’s 
exposure to supply risks and better prepare for supply disruptions, the responsible 
managers can employ two basic approaches. On the one hand, they can act proactively 
and aim at reducing the probability of a supply disruption to occur or mitigating the 
consequences of such adverse events (supply risk management). On the other hand, they 
can decide to cope with the aftermath of a materialized risk in a reactive fashion (supply 
disruption management) (Craighead, Blackhurst, Rungtusanatham, & Handfield, 2007). 
Various proactive and reactive activities have been delineated in prior research and the 
negative consequences of supply disruptions are well-known (Hendricks & Singhal, 
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2005b). However, and although most executives make supply risk management a top 
priority, many firms appear to be unprepared to cope with supply disruptions (A.T. 
Kearney & RapidRatings, 2018).  
Certain types of supply disruptions – especially those characterized by high impact 
but low probability – cannot be avoided or resolved as part of daily operations 
management. These events need to be appropriately addressed to mitigate their 
potentially severe negative consequences, as highlighted by recent industry examples: An 
explosion at a steel supplier’s plant in Nagoya, Japan, forced Toyota to halt production at 
all of their Japanese factories for one week (Tovey, 2016), online fashion company ASOS 
was exposed to massive criticism due to the identification of child workers in its supply 
chain (J. Webb, 2016a), and BASF suffered from a natural gas shortage that required a 
shutdown of one of its major factories in China (Bradsher, 2017). To effectively prepare 
for such sudden disruptions and mitigate their negative repercussions is a complex task. 
In this regard, relatively little is known about the behavior of individuals within 
supply risk and supply disruption management (Macdonald & Corsi, 2013). Given the 
circumstance that a large fraction of the decisions concerning crisis situations is typically 
made by single decision makers with centralized authority (Dubrovski, 2004), it is 
surprising that behavioral aspects have been neglected in research on supply risk and 
disruptions, so far. Thus, the aim of this dissertation research is to shed light on specific 
research questions that cover behavioral aspects of managing supply risks and disruptions 
to improve our understanding of how to effectively address them. The results not only 
provide novel implications for theory and practice but also reveal certain fruitful avenues 
for future research. 
1.2 Research questions 
The research questions addressed in the course of this dissertation revolve around 
important issues of decision making in supply risk and supply disruption management. 
These issues have received only limited research attention and benefit from novel insights 
to improve our understanding of how supply risks and disruptions can effectively be 
addressed. In the extant literature on supply risks and disruptions, there is an agreement 
that supply disruptions follow a typical profile with regard to their impact on firm 
performance over time (Sheffi, 2005). In case that a supply risk materializes, a subsequent 
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supply disruption leads to a sudden drop in operating performance. This disturbance 
causes firms to initiate recovery efforts to return to normal performance levels. 
Figure 1 depicts this typical supply disruption profile and provides an overview of 
how the three research questions addressed by this dissertation are linked to it. In 
particular, the first research question explores why some managers act proactively to 
mitigate the potential loss from future supply disruptions while others do not. The second 
research question aims to shed light on how prior engagement in corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) affects negative stakeholder reactions to a materialized CSR-related 
risk. Finally, the third research question addresses the issue of how quickly decision 
makers should and do actually initiate recovery efforts after their firm has been hit by a 
supply disruption. Each of these research questions was approached by means of carefully 
designed and executed experiments to enable a controlled test of the relationships 
investigated. In the following, the three research questions are delineated in more detail. 
Figure 1: Overview of research questions 
Note. CSIR refers to corporate social irresponsibility. 
1.2.1 Research question 1: Supply risk management 
The overarching aim of supply risk management is to pursue a combination of activities 
for which the remaining amount of risk complies with the firm’s risk preference and 
corporate strategy (Hofmann, Busse, Bode, & Henke, 2014). Although it is well-known 
that supply risk management is associated with certain benefits (Mitroff & Alpaslan, 
2003; Norrman & Jansson, 2004), it remains largely unexplored how and why some 
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managers decide to take proactive action to mitigate the impact of future supply 
disruptions while others do not. The related managerial choices strongly influence to 
which degree firms are able to cope with supply disruptions. Hence, to contribute to an 
improved understanding of this issue, it is vital to unravel behavioral components of 
supply risk management. 
A relatively similar problem has been investigated by health-related research. 
Analyzing the factors that shape an individual’s decision to adopt certain preventive 
health behaviors, Rogers (1975, 1983) developed protection motivation theory (PMT). 
PMT is based on the idea that when individuals are exposed to a threat, their probability 
to adopt a certain coping response depends on two cognitive appraisal processes. These 
appraisal processes take factors into account that are associated with the costs and impact 
of a potential proactive action (coping appraisal) as well as the characteristics of a threat 
and the consequences of not taking proactive action (threat appraisal). Although PMT 
has initially been developed to study the effects of fear appeals on health behavior, it has 
moved far beyond them and is considered generalizable to “apply to any situation 
involving threat” (Rogers, 1983, p. 172). 
PMT serves as an insightful framework to study decisions on whether or not 
managers proactively address supply risks and contributes to a better understanding of 
the role that individual managers’ behaviors play within the process of managing supply 
risks. Hence, Study 1 in Chapter 2 employs PMT to examine proactive decision making 
to provide an answer to the following research question: 
Research 
Question 1 
Why do some decision makers decide to proactively act to mitigate 
the impact of future supply disruptions while others do not? 
1.2.2 Research question 2: The influence of supply risk management on the impact 
of disruptions 
Despite the growing pressure that stakeholders can exert on firms to adhere to ethical 
standards and behave in socially responsible ways (Campbell, 2007), the amplified public 
awareness and availability of information on environmental and social misconduct 
(Fiaschi, Giuliani, & Nieri, 2017), and the increasingly difficult challenge for firms to 
prevent irresponsible behavior in their supply chains (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014), the 
issue of corporate social irresponsibility (CSIR) in supply chains has been neglected in 
the academic discussion of CSR. In the academic literature on CSR, there is a strong focus 
on equating CSR with “doing good”, although it has been shown that “avoiding bad” also 
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constitutes an important precondition for a firm to successfully position itself as socially 
responsible (Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013). 
Prior research has predominantly assumed that a firm’s ex ante CSR activities may 
serve as a “reservoir of goodwill” among the firm’s stakeholders that mitigates negative 
reactions to CSIR (e.g., Flammer, 2013; Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009; Jones, Jones, 
& Little, 2000; Klein & Dawar, 2004). However, there are reasons to seriously doubt that 
these insurance-like effects of ex ante CSR in case of CSIR universally apply. Several 
studies suggest that firms which engage in CSR experience more negative reactions to 
CSIR compared to firms which do not promote themselves as socially responsible (e.g., 
Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; Swaen & Vanhamme, 2003; Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009). 
Moreover, examples like Volkswagen (VW) that won numerous awards for CSR but 
recently faced severe criticism due to the “Dieselgate” scandal contradict the idea of 
insurance-like effects of prior CSR (Lynn, 2015). 
Some researchers argue that a possible explanation for these contrary effects might 
be that, similar to brand commitment (Germann, Grewal, Ross, & Srivastava, 2014), a 
reputation for CSR provides a goodwill buffer in case of non-severe CSIR but also serves 
as an expectation burden in case of severe CSIR (e.g., Janssen, Sen, & Bhattacharya, 
2015; Kang, Germann, & Grewal, 2016). Moreover, these effects of ex ante CSR 
reputations in times of crises might be subject to the nature of the employed activities to 
gain a CSR reputation, which can either be substantive or symbolic (Ashforth & Gibbs, 
1990). Substantive CSR is typically perceived as intrinsically motivated while symbolic 
CSR is associated with extrinsic motives. In case of CSIR, instead of assuming a lack of 
proper management or even malevolence, stakeholders are more willing to develop 
alternative explanations for CSIR if they perceive a firm’s CSR engagement to be 
intrinsically motivated rather than extrinsically driven (Janssen et al., 2015). 
Study 2 focusses on the role of the purchasing function as gatekeeper to CSIR-
related risks in the supply chain of a focal firm and contributes to a better understanding 
of negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR. More specifically, this research investigates 
whether the effect of a CSR reputation on negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR in 
professional buying contexts depends on CSIR severity and the reputation’s nature 
(substantive vs. symbolic). Thereby, we explore the influence of proactive CSR 
engagement on negative stakeholder reactions to a realized CSIR-related risk. Thus, the 
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research presented in Chapter 3 aims to provide an answer to the following research 
question: 
Research 
Question 2 
How are negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR in industrial 
buying contexts shaped by the type of CSR reputation and the CSIR 
severity? 
1.2.3 Research question 3: Supply disruption management 
Decision making in supply disruption response and recovery situations is often difficult, 
because choices have to be made dynamically in complex environments that are 
characterized by uncertainty and limited information. Under these conditions, there are 
two basic approaches of taking recovery decisions. Some firms defer actions until reliable 
information is available for a sound judgment; other firms respond immediately, even 
though the information at hand is cloudy or fragmented (Kleinmuntz & Thomas, 1987). 
Using the analogy of shooting, the first approach can be termed “ready-aim-fire” (RAF) 
and the second “ready-fire-aim” (RFA). Intuitively, RAF may lead to more precise 
actions and a better solution quality than RFA, but the time required to gather additional 
information may allow quicker competitors to obtain superior positions. Conversely, 
RFA carries the inefficiencies of trial and error and, when decisions are irreversible and 
path-dependent, the risk of pursuing an inferior recovery path. Hence, the key question 
for managers concerned with supply disruptions is: Under which conditions should a 
decision maker delay its recovery decision until more evidence is acquired? 
It is not always trivial to select one of the two presented approaches (RAF and RFA) 
as highlighted by the often-cited Albuquerque fire (Latour, 2001). On March 17, 2000, a 
Philips plant in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was hit by lightning and caught fire (Lee, 
2004). Initially, it seemed that the damage would be limited. Philips informed the two 
main customers of the chips produced at this plant, Nokia and Ericsson, about an expected 
delivery delay of one week. Yet, the responses of the two competitors were completely 
different. Nokia immediately put pressure on Philips and quickly collaborated with 
alternative suppliers to recover from the disruption with merely limited negative 
consequences. Ericsson adopted a “wait and see” approach and delayed remedial action 
until more evidence about the supply disruption had been acquired. By the time it became 
obvious that the damage to the clean rooms was far more severe than expected, Ericsson 
was not able to find an alternative supplier on short notice. As a result, Ericsson had to 
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delay the launch of a new product and, finally, also ceased its own handset production as 
a further consequence of this incident (Latour, 2001; Sheffi, 2005). 
This example highlights that a firm’s ability to effectively respond to supply 
disruptions is not only vital to its short-term performance but also essential for its long-
term competitiveness. However, supply disruption management has received only limited 
research attention. In particular, there is a need to gain a better understanding of how the 
responsible managers should respond to disruptive events in their firm’s upstream supply 
chain to quickly recover from their negative consequences (Bode, Wagner, Petersen, & 
Ellram, 2011; Macdonald & Corsi, 2013). Moreover, there is a need to investigate how 
and to which extent the responsible decision makers’ intended choices deviate from how 
they should behave. Hence, the following research question is addressed by Study 3 as 
presented in Chapter 4: 
Research 
Question 3 
Under which conditions should a manager delay its response 
actions until more evidence is acquired and how do managers 
actually intend to behave? 
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Chapter 2 Supply disruptions and protection 
motivation: Why some managers act 
proactively (and others don’t) 
Co-authors: 
Christoph Bode 
Endowed Chair of Procurement, Business School, University of Mannheim, Germany 
John R. Macdonald 
Department of Management, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, USA 
Abstract1 
Supply disruptions present considerable managerial challenges and have severe 
consequences. To protect their firms from disturbances, managers must decide whether 
or not to take proactive measures. However, little is known about how they make these 
decisions. Protection motivation theory suggests that an individual’s intention to respond 
to a threat by acting proactively results from cognitive appraisal processes. These 
processes evaluate the characteristics of a potential coping response (e.g., its effectiveness 
in averting the threat) and the threat itself (e.g., its severity). Building on this framework, 
this study presents an analysis of what drives managers to or deters them from responding 
to the threat of a supply chain disruption. The exploratory results from a discrete choice 
experiment show that decision makers have a strong subconscious focus on cost-related 
aspects of a specific proactive action, while consciously prioritizing the efficacy of the 
action over its costs. Thus, the study provides interesting and novel insights into 
behavioral aspects of supply chain risk management by revealing that decision makers’ 
perceptions of the relative importance of proactive action attributes deviate considerably 
from their actual choice behavior. Additionally, proactive personality, risk attitude, 
control appraisal, and experience had significant effects on the relative importance of 
certain proactive action attributes.   
                                                          
1 Merath, M., Bode, C., and Macdonald, J. R., 2018. Supply disruptions and protection motivation: Why 
some managers act proactively (and others don’t). Unpublished Working Paper, 1-38. An earlier version 
was nominated for the “ISM Best Paper in Supply Chain Management Award” of the Operations and 
Supply Chain Management Division of the Academy of Management at the Annual Meeting in Chicago, 
IL, in 2018. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Supply chain disruptions are “unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt the normal 
flow of goods and materials within a supply chain […] and, as a consequence, expose 
firms within the supply chain to operational and financial risks” (Craighead et al., 2007, 
p. 132). Minor disruptions can often be resolved within day-to-day operations, but high 
impact–low probability disruptions pose serious challenges for managers. Moreover, 
disruptions tend to be “more critical when they occur upstream in the chain” (Pereira et 
al., 2014, p. 627). For example, BMW suspended production in China for one week due 
to supplier parts shortages (Moriyasu, 2017), BASF’s U.S. plant was temporarily shut 
down following a disruption at an external supplier (Burger & Sheahan, 2018), and 
Toyota suffered from the interruptions in the supply of raw materials after a major 
earthquake in Japan (Tajitsu & Yamazaki, 2016). Hence, this study examines disruptions 
in a focal firm’s upstream supply chain that cannot be resolved within daily operations 
management (hereafter: Supply disruptions). 
There are two ways to address and manage a firm’s exposure to such disruptions. 
Managers can either decide to proactively tackle supply disruptions with measures aimed 
at minimizing the probability of their occurrence or mitigating their damage (hereafter: 
Supply risk management), or reactively cope with the adverse effects of a materialized 
risk (hereafter: Supply disruption management) (Craighead et al., 2007). The overall goal 
of both approaches is to determine a mix of activities for which the remaining amount of 
risk is in line with the firm’s risk preference and corporate strategy (Hofmann et al., 
2014). The related choices considerably affect the degree to which firms can recover from 
supply disruptions (e.g., Habermann, Blackhurst, & Metcalf, 2015; Yildiz, Yoon, Talluri, 
& Ho, 2016), but behavioral aspects of supply risk management remain relatively unclear 
(Bode & Macdonald, 2017). More specifically, although the negative consequences of 
supply disruptions (Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a,b) and the benefits of supply risk 
management are well-known (Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003; Norrman & Jansson, 2004), 
little is known about why some decision makers proactively act to mitigate the impact of 
future supply disruptions while others do not. 
Health-related research faces a similar problem. Analyzing the factors that shape 
the decision to engage in a certain preventive health behavior, Rogers (1975, 1983) 
developed protection motivation theory (PMT). PMT centers upon two cognitive 
appraisal processes that account for the impact and costs of a potential proactive action 
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(coping appraisal) as well as the components of a threat and the consequences of not 
taking proactive action (threat appraisal). These appraisal processes ultimately affect a 
person’s propensity of adopting a coping response. Although PMT was developed to 
discern the effects of fear appeals (appeals using fear as the driving motivation) on health 
attitudes and behavior, it has moved far beyond them and is considered applicable “to any 
situation involving threat” (Rogers, 1983, p. 172). 
This study applies PMT to understand why managers do or do not decide to take 
proactive action in preparation for supply disruptions. More specifically, an extended 
version of the PMT framework is proposed which also integrates and accounts for certain 
individual characteristics that have been identified to influence proactive behavior. The 
proposed model was subjected to empirical scrutiny by means of discrete choice 
experiments, which emulated a decision making situation under uncertainty and the threat 
of a future supply disruption. In order to explore which factors predict managers’ intent 
to take proactive action, the participating managers were provided with systematically 
manipulated choice scenarios and response options. The empirical results reveal the 
relative importance of specific proactive action attributes, highlight a mismatch between 
managers’ choice behavior and perceptions, and show relationships between individual-
specific characteristics and proactive action attributes. Thereby, this study contributes to 
a better understanding of managers’ behavior when managing supply chain risks. 
2.2 Protection motivation theory and propositions 
There is consensus among scholars that proactive behavior involves “anticipatory action 
that employees take to impact themselves and/or their environments” (Grant & Ashford, 
2008, p. 8). Two characteristics that distinguish proactive from reactive behavior are 
acting in advance and intended impact (Grant & Ashford, 2008). Proactivity means being 
future-focused by planning and selecting specific measures to modify the environment 
before certain events occur (Bandura, 2006). Moreover, proactive behavior is goal-driven 
and intended to bring about environmental change (Bateman & Crant, 1993). 
To better understand an individual’s proactive motivation, most attention has been 
devoted to how humans assess the likely outcomes of their behavior (S. K. Parker, 
Williams, & Turner, 2006) and the reasons for them to strive for a certain proactive goal 
(Griffin, Neal, & Parker, 2007). In the supply risk context, the purpose of taking proactive 
action is to protect the focal firm from future damage. Numerous studies, mostly in the 
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field of health, have been conducted to understand how people decide to behave when 
exposed to various threats (e.g., Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006; Sheeran, Harris, & Epton, 
2013). In line with these research efforts, several cognitive behavioral theories attempt to 
explain how proactive behavior is initiated, but they vary with regard to the assumed 
mediating processes and their applicability to different contexts. All major cognitive 
behavioral models originated in expectancy-value theories (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 
1953). The premise of the family of expectancy-value theories is that an individual’s 
intention to adopt a specific behavior depends on his or her expectations of its 
consequences and its value. Expectancy-value theories were used to shed light on the 
effects of fear appeals, which are “persuasive messages with the intent to motivate 
individuals to comply with a recommended course of action through the arousal of fear 
associated with a threat” (A. C. Johnston & Warkentin, 2010, pp. 550-551).  
Three stimuli form a typical fear appeal. The first constitutes a value component 
and the other two shape expectations: (1) The magnitude of an event’s harmfulness (value 
component), (2) the probability that this event will occur given that no protective behavior 
is adopted or existing behavior is modified (expectancy component), and (3) the 
availability and effectiveness of a coping response that might prevent adverse 
consequences of the event (expectancy component). 
Based on expectancy-value theories, PMT was originally developed to study the 
impact of fear appeals on health-related behavior and support their effective design 
(Rogers, 1975). Its revised version (Rogers, 1983) has enabled the theory to evolve and 
encompass not only health-related threats – where it has been successfully applied (Floyd, 
Prentice‐Dunn, & Rogers, 2000) – but also nuclear actions (Axelrod & Newton, 1991), 
and, more recently, technological or environmental hazards (Boss, Galletta, Lowry, 
Moody, & Polak, 2015; Y. Chen & Zahedi, 2016). PMT has become “sufficiently broad 
to apply to any situation involving threat” (Rogers, 1983, p. 172) and is considered “an 
established, robust theoretical foundation for the analysis and exploration of 
recommended actions or behaviors to avert the consequences of threats” (A. C. Johnston 
& Warkentin, 2010, p. 552). In line with this, we suggest that PMT offers an adequate 
and insightful framework to improve our understanding of how the threat of an impending 
supply disruption translates into proactive action. More specifically, it allows us to 
investigate the drivers of, and impediments to, an individual’s motivation to take 
proactive action. PMT has received widespread empirical support (A. C. Johnston & 
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Warkentin, 2010) and provides an effective theory for human behavior which overcomes 
many conceptual problems leading to low correlations between attitudes and behavior 
(McGuire, 1985). 
Figure 2 depicts the revised version of PMT (Rogers, 1983), which assumes that 
several sources of information about an impending threat, categorized as either 
environmental or intrapersonal, may initiate PMT’s key mediating processes. These 
sources of information comprise, for example, prior experience or observational learning. 
Both prior experience and observational learning are considered important triggers of 
adaptation processes in supply disruption management (Bode et al., 2011; Hora & 
Klassen, 2013). In addition, it is important to note that “any source of information can 
lead to any of the mediating processes” (Rogers, 1983, p. 167). 
Figure 2: Overall model of protection motivation theory (based on Rogers (1983)) 
 
The mediating processes at the core of PMT are coping appraisal and threat 
appraisal. The former evaluates the adaptive response (e.g., taking proactive action to 
prevent damage), while the latter assesses the maladaptive response (e.g., maintaining the 
status quo). Each process comprises variables that either increase or decrease the 
probability of adopting the respective response. As shown in Figure 2, the evaluation of 
the variables within each appraisal process is assumed to summate algebraically into a 
final appraisal of coping as well as threat; a protection motivation. Finally, both processes 
affect the strength of this motivation, which determines whether or not proactive action 
is taken. Protection motivation can be understood as a behavioral intention that may result 
in a single act, repeated acts, multiple acts, or repeated multiple acts that involve either 
direct action or its inhibition. Feedback from coping behavior will enter the PMT model 
as “prior experience” for reappraisals of threats and coping responses to adjust an 
individual’s protection motivation (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
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2.2.1 Coping appraisal 
An adaptive response aims at proactively coping with the potential negative consequences 
associated with a threat. The coping appraisal process evaluates the ability of an 
individual to cope with and avert being harmed by the threat. Three major components 
lead to the overall evaluation of coping: Response efficacy and self-efficacy increase an 
individual’s willingness to perform a proactive action; the costs associated with the 
response decrease it. Response efficacy is the perception that a specific proactive action 
will avert the dangers of a threat. Self-efficacy is the belief in one’s ability to successfully 
perform a specific action. It was proposed to be a major component of almost all processes 
of psychological change and exerts a considerable influence on whether or not a certain 
behavior is chosen and how much effort will be invested in its execution (Bandura, 1977). 
However, the concept of self-efficacy had largely been neglected in any of the social-
cognitive behavioral models based on expectancy-value theories. The revised version of 
PMT was the first of these models to incorporate self-efficacy into the study of proactive 
decision making behavior (Rogers, 1983). Finally, any costs of adopting the adaptive 
response refer to its response costs which will reduce the appeal of a specific response 
option. Response costs can refer to financial costs as well as inconvenience, time, and 
effort (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006). 
Hence, the coping appraisal process of PMT suggests that decision makers assess 
the appeal of a specific proactive action alternative on the basis of three characteristics: 
(1) The effectiveness of the alternative (response efficacy), (2) an individual’s ability to 
successfully perform the action (self-efficacy), and (3) the costs associated with taking 
the proactive action alternative (response costs). Formally: 
Proposition 1. Individual decision makers select proactive action alternatives to 
prepare for the threat of an impending supply disruption based on 
(a) an alternative’s effectiveness, 
(b) perceived self-efficacy, and 
(c) the costs associated with an alternative. 
If an alternative offers an attractive package in terms of these 
criteria, it is more likely to be chosen. 
2.2.2 Threat appraisal 
A maladaptive response exposes an individual or a firm to a threat (e.g., being 
“unprepared” for a supply disruption), and is composed of intrinsic rewards, extrinsic 
rewards, severity, and vulnerability (see Figure 2). Intrinsic rewards and extrinsic 
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rewards increase the probability of choosing a maladaptive response. In contrast, the 
severity of a threat and the expectancy of being exposed to the threat (vulnerability) 
reduce the attractiveness of a maladaptive response. Severity is the potential amount of 
physical or economic damage associated with a threat (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1997). 
At the same time, although fear was initially seen as an essential mediating variable of 
the effect of fear appeals on behavior, it is not considered to have a direct influence on 
protection motivation. It merely has an indirect impact through the evaluation of a threat’s 
severity; therefore, fear is treated as “an insignificant byproduct of threat appraisal” 
(Tanner, Hunt, & Eppright, 1991, p. 37) to underline the “importance of cognitive 
processes rather than visceral ones” (Rogers, 1983, p. 169). PMT posits that the 
motivation of an individual to take a maladaptive response will decrease if the threat is 
severe, the vulnerability to the threat is high, one is able to successfully perform a 
proactive action, and this response can effectively avert the threat’s potential negative 
consequences. A maladaptive response’s likelihood will increase if the response is 
accompanied by rewards and performing the proactive action is costly. 
Prior research using the PMT framework revealed serious difficulties in 
operationalizing the rewards of a maladaptive response as distinct from the costs of a 
proactive action. For this reason, the vast majority of PMT research has neglected the 
rewards component and response costs have to date not been extensively researched. 
Although these components are delineated as conceptually different (Rogers, 1983), the 
distinction between them might not be clear to managers who could perceive them as 
equal (maladaptive response rewards could be perceived as avoiding the costs of a 
proactive action). In line with prior research, to avoid duplicating the same factor, we 
focus on response costs (Grothmann & Reusswig, 2006; A. C. Johnston & Warkentin, 
2010; Tanner et al., 1991). 
The vulnerability to a specific threat may affect the relative importance of response 
costs. In other words, the vulnerability of a firm to a specific supply disruption might 
moderate the influence of a proactive measure’s costs on the decision whether to take 
action. If a proactive measure is very costly, a high vulnerability to an impending 
disruption may also increase intentions to act proactively due to the higher expected loss 
associated with the materialized risk (Knemeyer, Zinn, & Eroglu, 2009; Norrman & 
Jansson, 2004). Thus, we propose the following: 
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Proposition 2. The relative importance of response costs for the probability of 
choosing a specific proactive action to cope with a supply disruption 
is reduced by the vulnerability of a firm to a supply disruption. 
Although PMT presents the two appraisal processes in an unordered fashion, later 
studies suggest that threat appraisal precedes coping appraisal (Scherer, 1984, 1988; 
Tanner et al., 1991). We follow the notion of an ordered sequence between the two 
mediating processes in our experimental design, which will be explained in the 
methodology section. 
2.2.3 Individual characteristics 
Finally, certain characteristics of individual decision makers and of the situation arguably 
influence proactive behavior in organizations (S. K. Parker et al., 2006). Based on the 
results of a cross-cultural longitudinal study that revealed several key antecedents of 
proactive behavior, Frese and Fay (2001) theorized that those antecedents associated with 
individual decision makers can be categorized as (1) personality, (2) orientations, and (3) 
knowledge, skills, and abilities. 
First, personality refers to individual differences that represent proclivity for action 
and cross-situational tendencies that activate decision makers. It has been argued that 
proactive personality is the most relevant individual predictor of proactive behavior. It 
is defined as a disposition toward taking action to bring about change and influence the 
environment (Bateman & Crant, 1993; S. K. Parker et al., 2006). In addition, since this 
study investigates a decision involving risk, we argue that an individual’s risk attitude 
specifies how important a certain risk is to an individual and has a strong influence on 
his or her proactive decision making behavior (Heckmann, Comes, & Nickel, 2015). 
Different perceptions of the importance of a certain risk may considerably influence 
decision making processes and resulting outcomes. Generally, three manifestations of a 
decision maker’s risk attitude are distinguished: Risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-
seeking (Weber & Milliman, 1997). Prior research has shown that, depending on their 
risk attitude, different decision makers may perceive the same risk situation quite 
differently which has repercussions on choice behavior (March & Shapira, 1987). 
Second, in contrast to the cross-situational and rather general personality factors, 
orientations are “behavior tendencies of moderate situational specificity” (Fay & Frese, 
2001, p. 106). Orientations motivate proactive behavior by making a person believe that 
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such behavior is possible and can produce the desired results. Frese and Fay (2001) 
proposed that an important orientation for promoting proactivity is a person’s control 
appraisal: An individual’s expectation of his or her impact on work outcomes. Decision 
makers who assume that their own decisions have a strong effect on their work outcomes 
are more likely to engage in proactive action while low levels of control appraisal inhibit 
proactive action (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997). 
Finally, knowledge, skills, and abilities capture an individual’s capacity to identify 
work-related challenges, analyze them, and develop appropriate solutions (Hunter, 
1986). Hence, a person’s understanding of a task determines the ability to act proactively. 
As an indicator of an individual’s knowledge, skills, and abilities, experience 
considerably affects intention to act proactively. Work experience has been identified as 
a main driver of knowledge, and hence, of the development of skills and techniques that 
improve job performance (F. L. Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986). Following prior 
research, more experienced decision makers might be more likely to act proactively, 
because they possess the requisite knowledge and skills to successfully engage in 
proactive behavior (Grant & Ashford, 2008; Grant, Parker, & Collins, 2009). 
Based on the framework developed by Frese and Fay (2001), it is proposed that 
these four characteristics affect proactive behavior by influencing the relative importance 
of PMT’s coping appraisal components: 
Proposition 3. The relative importance of PMT’s coping appraisal components for 
the probability of choosing a specific proactive action is influenced 
by characteristics of individual decision makers, namely their 
(a) proactive personality, 
(b) risk attitude, 
(c) control appraisal, and 
(d) experience. 
2.3 Methodology 
To evaluate the developed propositions and analyze the factors influencing decisions to 
engage in proactive preparation for supply disruptions, a discrete choice experiment 
(DCE) was developed. DCEs are considered an effective way to analyze complex 
decision making tasks and choice behavior (Louviere, Hensher, & Swait, 2000; Moore, 
Gray-Lee, & Louviere, 1998). Although they have successfully been applied to analyze 
choice behavior in fields such as marketing, economics, or health research, they have only 
rarely been used in operations management (e.g., E. J. Anderson, Coltman, Devinney, & 
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Keating, 2011; Coltman & Devinney, 2013; Pullman, Verma, & Goodale, 2001; Verma, 
Louviere, & Burke, 2006). DCEs expose participants to multiple choice situations with 
at least two possible response alternatives. Each specific choice situation (comprised of 
several choice alternatives) is referred to as choice set. The response alternatives in a 
choice set consist of a set of attributes. If no alternative option outperforms the others on 
all attributes, decision makers must perform trade-offs between these observed 
characteristics of response alternatives. This is described in further detail in the 
experimental design section. Regardless of whether these trade-offs are determined 
consciously or subconsciously, stated choice preferences reveal the underlying weight or 
importance assigned to specific attributes (E. J. Anderson et al., 2011). 
2.3.1 Experimental design 
The developed experimental design exposed all participants to nine choice sets 
comprising three possible response options. The order of choice sets presented was 
randomized for each participant to control for order effects (Potoglou & Kanaroglou, 
2007). For each choice set, two of the presented alternatives were generic proactive 
response actions: “Proactive action A” and “proactive action B”. These alternatives varied 
along one or more attributes of interest. Since decisions involving supply risk in practice 
also allow individuals to refrain from taking proactive action, a third “no choice” 
alternative labelled “neither” was included.2 Whether to include an opt-out alternative is 
an important methodological issue and is becoming the norm in choice experiments (J. 
R. Parker & Schrift, 2011). Failure to include a “no choice” option may distort the results 
by overestimating participation by forcing some participants to choose (Boyle, Holmes, 
Teisl, & Roe, 2001). In addition, offering an opt-out option improves the realism of 
experiments (Louviere et al., 2000). 
A D-optimal3 design allows for an analysis of the attributes’ main effects and the 
proposed interactions. To ensure participants’ understanding of the discrete choice 
format, an additional tenth choice set was included as a consistency check (Green & 
                                                          
2 We also included the following description to add a more nuanced and realistic notion of what choosing 
the “no choice” option actually meant: “Neither, because none of the other response alternatives seem 
appropriate.” 
3 D-optimality (or D-efficiency) is a widely used and well-established metric in the design of choice 
experiments. In order to construct statistically efficient designs, D-optimal designs maximize the Fisher 
information matrix (the determinant of the variance-covariance matrix of the model to be estimated) 
(Hensher, Rose, & Greene, 2005). 
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Gerard, 2009). In this tenth set, one of the two proactive actions was clearly constructed 
as the dominant alternative (i.e., all attribute levels were more desirable). Thus, to “pass” 
the consistency check, respondents had to choose either the dominant or the “no choice” 
alternative. At the end of the experiment, participants responded to a brief survey to 
collect individual-specific data. 
Scenario Design.4 To ensure that the participants were provided with the same 
contextual information, they were given a carefully designed introductory paragraph to 
read before they were shown the choice sets. This common module delineated the 
underlying choice scenario from the perspective of a third person to limit demand 
characteristics and effects of social desirability (Fisher, 1993; Thomas, Thomas, Manrodt, 
& Rutner, 2013). In this scenario, a procurement manager observes that an earthquake in 
Asia has caused a serious supply disruption to a competitor. This manager also sources 
parts from Asia so his or her firm is vulnerable to a similar supply disruption. Hence, the 
manager needs to decide whether or not to mitigate future potential losses by taking 
proactive action. By framing the choice situation in a vicarious learning context, we 
account for the relevance of observing other firms as an important source of information 
in supply risk and disruption management and increase the experiment’s realism (Hora & 
Klassen, 2013). Moreover, supply disruptions due to natural disasters frequently inflict 
substantial damage on firms involved (e.g., Helft & Bunkley, 2011; Tajitsu & Yamazaki, 
2016; J. Webb, 2016b). 
The description of the underlying choice situation discusses the threat appraisal 
variables of PMT. First, the potential damage of disruption caused by an earthquake was 
described as severe (severity). This is important, because of the focus on high-impact 
supply disruptions that cannot be resolved in daily operations management. Second, we 
systematically manipulated the probability that the disruption will harm the decision 
maker’s firm (vulnerability). We distinguished low from high vulnerability by varying 
the earthquake-proneness of the Asian supplier’s location in the description. Participants 
were randomly assigned to one of these two treatment conditions to assess whether or not 
vulnerability moderates the effect of response costs on choice behavior. In this way we 
                                                          
4 Although DCEs and vignette-based experiments pursue different aims (DCEs: Interested in trade-offs 
between attributes; Vignette-based experiments: Investigate the impact of certain variables on observed 
intentions or actual behavior), both approaches share similarities with regard to how information about 
an a priori defined role and/or situation is presented to respondents. Hence, scenario design and validation 
was partly based on recommendations for vignette-experiments (e.g., Aguinis & Bradley, 2014; 
Rungtusanatham, Wallin, & Eckerd, 2011). 
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eliminate systematic differences in the respondents to be able to attribute differences in 
response behavior to the treatment condition (Bachrach & Bendoly, 2011). The scenario 
descriptions can be found in Table 1. 
To assess the realism of the developed scenario and whether the participants 
perceived both levels of vulnerability and the potentially severe impact of the impending 
disruption as intended (Wason, Polonsky, & Hyman, 2002), we pre-tested the DCE with 
72 graduate students. Responses to manipulation checks resulted in significantly different 
mean responses for low and high levels of vulnerability. Moreover, high severity was 
appropriately represented and the two scenario descriptions with varying degrees of 
vulnerability appeared realistic with means of 5.29 and 5.56 (grand mean is 5.44), 
evaluated on a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 := “not at all” to 7 := “completely”). The results 
of the DCE task were analyzed and used as priors for the generation of the D-optimal 
design of the DCE. 
Table 1: Scenario descriptions 
Introduction 
and severity 
Leo is procurement manager for Eletrox and is responsible for buying microchips. 
Two weeks ago, Eletrox’s major competitor was severely hit by a supply disruption 
in Asia that caused this firm to cease its own production for three days and suffer 
immense losses. An earthquake destroyed large parts of its supplier’s production 
facilities and inventories. In order to prepare for comparable future events, this 
competitor subsequently implemented proactive measures. 
Factor Manipulated factor levels 
Vulnerability 
Low High 
Eletrox also buys microchips from Asia 
and could be severely hit by such a 
disruption. Leo considers taking 
proactive action to mitigate future losses. 
Eletrox’s microchip supplier is located in 
an only slightly earthquake-prone 
region. Hence, its vulnerability to 
earthquake-related supply disruptions in 
Asia is low. 
Eletrox also buys microchips from Asia 
and could be severely hit by such a 
disruption. Leo considers taking 
proactive action to mitigate future losses. 
Eletrox’s microchip supplier is located in 
a very earthquake-prone region. 
Hence, its vulnerability to earthquake-
related supply disruptions in Asia is high. 
Attributes and Their Levels. In the early design stages of a DCE, relevant attributes 
for the decision task need to be identified. The coping appraisal process of PMT suggests 
that decision makers assess the appeal of a specific proactive action alternative based on 
three characteristics: (1) The effectiveness of the response alternative in averting or 
mitigating a threat (response efficacy), (2) an individual’s ability to successfully perform 
the action (self-efficacy), and (3) the costs of implementing the potential proactive action 
alternative (response costs). To appropriately represent these characteristics without 
making the task too complicated for the participants, each variable was operationalized 
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as binary with a low and a high level, by means of appropriate descriptions. Since prior 
research indicates that proactive measures are not only accompanied by direct financial 
costs but also have the potential to harm the relationship with a supplier (e.g., Heide, 
Wathne, & Rokkan, 2007; Zsidisin & Ritchie, 2008), we distinguished two types of 
response costs: Direct implementation costs and negative side effects on the respective 
buyer-supplier relationship (relationship costs). For instance, if a supplier formerly used 
as a single source for a specific part loses a considerable fraction of the demand to a 
second source because the buying firm seeks to reduce its risk associated with single 
sourcing, the original supplier might be less willing to develop new innovations for this 
customer “because of a smaller possibility to amortise the expenses” (Zsidisin & Ritchie, 
2008, p. 131). Accordingly, we describe relationship costs as decreased investments of 
the supplier into innovations for the buying firm. Table 2 offers descriptions of attributes’ 
levels. 
Table 2: Attribute level descriptions 
Attributes 
Attribute levels 
Low High 
Response efficacy 
This action can, to a small extent, 
reduce potential future losses 
This action can, to a large extent, 
reduce potential future losses 
Self-efficacy 
Leo doubts that he will be able to 
successfully implement this action 
Leo is sure that he will be able to 
successfully implement this action 
Direct implementation 
costs 
Direct implementation costs for this 
action are comparatively low 
Direct implementation costs for this 
action are comparatively high 
Relationship costs 
The current microchip supplier will 
spend slightly less money to develop 
innovations for Eletrox 
The current microchip supplier will 
spend considerably less money to 
develop innovations for Eletrox 
2.3.2 Study participants 
Data were collected between January and March 2018 by means of a self-administered 
online survey. In total, 308 professionals with direct experience in supply chain 
management from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, were invited to participate. 
Contact addresses were obtained from a commercial business data provider. The 
managers received an invitation via email and were randomly assigned to one of the two 
vulnerability conditions. Of the 308 professionals, 133 completed the DCE, resulting in 
an effective response rate of 43.2%. On average, participants had almost 15 years of 
experience in supply chain management (SD = 12.52). The participants were able to 
choose between a German and English version of the survey. Thirty-three of the 133 
participants (26.3%) opted for the English language version. To validate translation 
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equivalence, the complete experimental material was carefully translated into German by 
native speakers and then back-translated into English to ensure equivalent meaning (Craig 
& Douglas, 2005). Each participant responded to nine choice sets (and an additional tenth 
choice set as a consistency check). The responses of one participant were excluded due 
to unrealistically short participation duration. Further data were excluded because nine 
participants consistently chose the same alternative, resulting in a full sample of 1107 
observations. Hence, the data set comprises 123 participants (58 of these completed the 
low-vulnerability condition). 
Individual Characteristics. After the choice sets, the participants were asked to 
respond to several survey items measuring the specific individual characteristics stated in 
Proposition 3. First, to determine proactive personality (M = 5.17, SD = 0.82; coefficient 
α = 0.83), participants responded to a well-established reflective 10-item scale with a 7-
point Likert-type format (Seibert, Crant, & Kraimer, 1999) shown in Table 3. Second, we 
measured an individual’s risk attitude (M = 6.57, SD = 2.32) by means of the widely-used 
single item measure from (Dohmen et al., 2011) which was identified as the “the best all-
round predictor of risky behavior” (p. 522). It requires participants to rate their 
willingness to take risks, in general, on an 11-point rating scale. Third, control appraisal 
(M = 2.32, SD = 1.03; coefficient α = 0.75) was assessed with four reflective items on a 
rating-scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 7 (very true), adapted from S. K. Parker et 
al. (2006) (see Table 3). Finally, the respondents reported their experience (M = 14.49, 
SD = 12.70) in the field of supply chain management (measured in years). A summary of 
the measures’ descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations is shown in Table 4. 
The psychometric properties of the two reflective multi-item scales (proactive 
personality and control appraisal) were assessed using covariance-based confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA). The resulting fit of the measurement model to the data was 
acceptable (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2009): χ2(53) = 83.18 with p < 0.01 
(χ2/df = 1.57), CFI = 0.92, TLI = 0.91, SRMR = 0.06, and RMSEA = 0.07 (90% 
confidence interval CI = [0.04, 0.10]). As shown in Table 3, the factor loadings of all 
items were statistically significant (p < 0.001) and composite reliabilities (0.84 for 
proactive personality and 0.76 for control appraisal) exceeded the cut-off value of 0.70 
(Hair et al., 2009). The average variance extracted (AVE) values were slightly below 
(0.37 for proactive personality) and above (0.52 for control appraisal) the common 
threshold of 0.50.  
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Table 3: Multi-item measurement scales 
Measures and associated indicators 
Coefficient 
alpha 
Composite 
reliability 
λa SE 
Proactive personality (Seibert et al., 1999) 0.83 0.84   
Please indicate to which extent you agree with the following statements (1: strongly disagree – 7: 
strongly agree) 
PP1b I am constantly on the lookout for new ways to improve my life. - - 
PP2 Wherever I have been, I have been a powerful force for constructive change. 0.81 0.05 
PP3 Nothing is more exciting than seeing my ideas turn into reality. 0.64 0.06 
PP4 If I see something I don’t like, I fix it. 0.53 0.07 
PP5 No matter what the odds, if I believe in something I will make it happen. 0.52 0.08 
PP6 I love being a champion for my ideas, even against others’ opposition. 0.67 0.06 
PP7 I excel at identifying opportunities. 0.56 0.07 
PP8 I am always looking for better ways to do things. 0.47 0.08 
PP9 If I believe in an idea, no obstacle will prevent me from making it happen. 0.63 0.07 
PP10 I can spot a good opportunity long before others can. 0.55 0.07 
Control appraisal (S. K. Parker et al., 2006) 0.75 0.76   
Please indicate to which extent you consider the following statements true (1: not at all true – 7: very 
true) 
CA1b 
In my job, most of the problems that I experience are completely “out of my 
hands.” 
- - 
CA2 
With many of the problems I experience, it is not worth telling anybody 
because nothing will change. 
0.60 0.08 
CA3 I feel powerless to control the outcomes of the process I work on. 0.91 0.08 
CA4 The same problems keep happening again and again, regardless of what I do. 0.62 0.08 
Note. λ refers to standardized factor loading and SE to standard error (asymptotically robust estimate). 
a All factor loadings are significant at the p < 0.001 level (two-tailed). 
b Item was excluded to increase internal consistency. 
Table 4: Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
(1) Proactive personality 0.37  0.12  0.02  0.00  
(2) Risk attitude 0.35 *** –  0.00  0.00  
(3) Control appraisal –0.13  –0.03  0.52  0.04  
(4) Experience (in years) –0.07  0.02  –0.19 * –  
Mean (M) 5.17  6.57  2.32  14.49  
Standard deviation (SD) 0.82  2.32  1.03  12.70  
Note. n = 121. Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients are shown below the diagonal, diagonal 
values represent average variances extracted (where appropriate), and squared correlations (shared 
variance) are above the diagonal in italics. 
* p < 0.05 (equals |r| > 0.18), ** p < 0.01 (equals |r| > 0.23), *** p < 0.001 (equals |r| > 0.30) (two-tailed). 
Based on the composite reliability value of proactive personality, it can be 
concluded that convergent validity of the construct is adequate even though AVE is below 
0.50. Moreover, since both constructs extract more variance than they share (Pearson 
correlation coefficient r = –0.13; r2 = 0.02), discriminant validity is supported (Fornell & 
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Larcker, 1981). Having established the validity and reliability of the reflective scales, we 
used scale averages as latent variable scores for the following analyses. 
Consistency checks. A consistency check choice set, where one of the two proposed 
proactive actions was a dominant option (all attribute levels were more desirable), was 
used to assess participants’ understanding of the DCE task. Consistent participants chose 
either the dominant option or the “neither” alternative. Only two of the remaining 123 
respondents (1.5 %) failed this consistency check. Data from these respondents were 
excluded, reducing the sample to 1089 observations (121 included participants × 9 choice 
sets) for further analyses. 
Before analyzing the respondents’ choice behavior, the manipulations of 
vulnerability and severity in the description of the situational context were verified. To 
this end, all respondents were required to answer two manipulation check questions (7-
point rating scales anchored at 1 := “not at all” and 7 := “completely”) after reading the 
scenario description. To validate the manipulation of vulnerability, participants had to 
evaluate whether the vulnerability to the potential disruption of the protagonist’s firm was 
high. The participants’ responses were significantly different for low and high levels of 
vulnerability (Mlow = 3.02, Mhigh = 5.80; t(121), p < 0.001). Perceived severity was 
assessed by asking the participants to which extent they agree that the negative 
consequences of the depicted supply disruption would be severe for the firm of the 
protagonist. The average response of 5.93 (SD = 1.79) indicated that the participants were 
well aware of the potential severe damage that a future disruption could cause.  
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Estimation strategy 
Discrete choice analysis uses random utility theory to provide insights into the choice 
preferences of individuals (Thurstone, 1927). The main premise of random utility theory 
is that a decision maker’s utility for a certain response option is determined by an 
explainable systematic component and an unexplainable random component. The former 
comprises observed attributes of different choice alternatives and individual 
characteristics of a decision maker (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; McFadden, 1986), while 
the latter accounts for all unidentified factors of a decision task (Louviere, Flynn, & 
Carson, 2010). The characteristics of a decision maker are constant for each individual; 
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hence, they are typically considered as interaction terms with attributes or alternative-
specific constants in estimation models (Ryan, Gerard, & Amaya-Amaya, 2007). 
The most widely applied model to analyze and statistically test data from DCEs is 
the multinomial logit (MNL) model (also known as conditional logit model). MNL relies 
on the assumption that the random errors in the utility functions of individuals are 
independent and identically distributed according to Gumbel distribution. Formally, 
utility is defined as: 
𝑈𝑖𝑛 = 𝑉𝑖𝑛 + 𝜀𝑖𝑛. (1) 
Uin is the utility of individual n for choice alternative i, Vin is the explainable 
component, and 𝜀𝑖𝑛 is the unexplainable random component. 
DCEs typically expose participants to choice situations with at least two response 
options. The alternatives contained in each choice set are constructed by means of a set 
of attributes. MNL determines the probability of selecting a specific alternative from a 
set of multiple alternatives as follows (Ben-Akiva & Lerman, 1985; Louviere & 
Woodworth, 1983; McFadden, 1986): 
𝑃𝑖𝑗 =
𝑒𝑉𝑖𝑗
∑ 𝑒𝑉𝑘𝑗𝐾𝑘=1
 (2) 
where Pij is the probability of choosing alternative i from choice set j out of a total 
number of K possible alternatives. Vij is the explainable part of an individual’s utility 
function for alternative i in choice set j. This systematic utility component can be 
expressed as a function of attributes and characteristics of individual decision makers 
(Lancsar & Louviere, 2008): 
𝑉𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑙
′ + 𝛾𝑍𝑖
′ (3) 
with 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑙
′  being the vector of attributes and their specific levels l of alternative j for 
individual i and 𝑍𝑖
′ the vector of an individual’s characteristics. β and γ are the coefficient 
vectors to be estimated, typically by means of maximum likelihood estimation (Verma & 
Pullman, 1998). 
To analyze our DCE, we distinguish between two proactive actions (proactive 
action A and proactive action B) and a “no choice” option. Accordingly, we use the 
following specification of VA, VB, and Vno as the probability of choosing proactive action 
A, proactive action B, or “no choice”: 
Supply disruptions and protection motivation: Why some managers act proactively (and others don’t) 25 
 
𝑉𝐴 =  𝛽𝐴𝑆𝐶 +  𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹 +  𝛽𝑆𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑂 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂 
+ 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑂×𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑂 ×  𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑁 +  𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂×𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂 ×  𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑁  
(4) 
𝑉𝐵 =  𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑅𝐸𝐹𝐹 +  𝛽𝑆𝐸𝐹𝐹𝑆𝐸𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑂𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑂 + 𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂 
+ 𝛽𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑂×𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑁𝐷𝐼𝐶𝑂 ×  𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑁 +  𝛽𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂×𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑁𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑂 ×  𝑉𝑈𝐿𝑁  
(5) 
𝑉𝑛𝑜 =  𝛽𝑛𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒   (6) 
where βASC captures alternative-specific effects of proactive action A compared to 
B, and βREFF, βSEFF, βDICO, as well as βRECO are the coefficients for response efficacy 
(REFF), self-efficacy (SEFF), direct implementation costs (DICO), and relationship costs 
(RECO). βDICO×VULN and βRECO×VULN are the coefficients of the suggested interactions 
between response costs (DICO and RECO) and the scenario variable vulnerability 
(VULN). 𝛽𝑛𝑜𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 reflects the utility associated with the “no choice” option. To 
investigate Propositions 3a-3d, we added 16 interaction terms between all proactive 
action attributes (REFF, SEFF, DICO, and RECO) and individual-specific factors, 
namely proactive personality, risk attitude, control appraisal, and experience, to VA and 
VB. For the sake of clarity and due to space constraints, we do not show the augmented 
equations. 
If a “no choice” is offered to participants in a DCE, it has been recommended to 
consider the use of nested logit (NL) models (Ryan & Skåtun, 2004). To assess whether 
a nested logit outperforms the MNL model formulation, we constructed a NL model that 
we compared with the MNL model as delineated above. The NL model comprised the 
“no choice” option as one (degenerate) nest and the two proactive response options as a 
second nest. A likelihood ratio test revealed that a nested structure does not significantly 
improve model fit (χ2(9) = 7.43; p = 0.59). Hence, the MNL model specification was 
chosen. 
2.4.2 Model estimation 
Table 5 shows the results of the estimated MNL models as specified in equations 4, 5, 
and 6. Model 1 serves as a baseline model, which contains only four proactive action 
attributes that were incorporated in the discrete choice task and the interactions of 
response cost and vulnerability, as described in Proposition 2. In a second step, we 
incorporated the individual-specific factors assumed to influence choice behavior as 
proposed in Propositions 3a-3d into a second model (Model 2). Log likelihood ratio tests 
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support the statistical significance of Model 1 (χ2(6) = 230.75; p < 0.001) and Model 2 
(χ2(22) = 275.92; p < 0.001) and a likelihood ratio test between both models reveals 
significant improvements from Model 1 to Model 2 (χ2(16) = 45.18; p < 0.001). Hence, 
detailed results of Model 2 are discussed below. 
Table 5: Estimated MNL models 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Variable Prop. β SE p-value β SE p-value 
Utility from specific proactive action attributes          
Alternative-specific constant  0.16 0.11 0.13  0.18 0.11 0.11  
Response efficacy  
P1 
1.36 0.12 0.00 *** 1.38 0.12 0.00 *** 
Self-efficacy 1.55 0.14 0.00 *** 1.60 0.14 0.00 *** 
Direct implementation costs –1.93 0.35 0.00 *** –1.94 0.35 0.00 *** 
Relationship costs –1.79 0.29 0.00 *** –1.71 0.30 0.00 *** 
Direct implementation costs × Vulnerability 
P2 
0.48 0.19 0.01 * 0.45 0.20 0.02 * 
Relationship costs × Vulnerability 0.48 0.16 0.00 ** 0.39 0.16 0.02 * 
Response efficacy × Proactive personality 
P3 
    –0.33 0.12 0.01 ** 
Self-efficacy × Proactive personality     –0.15 0.13 0.25  
Direct implementation costs × Proactive personality     0.29 0.14 0.05 * 
Relationship costs × Proactive personality     0.09 0.14 0.53  
Response efficacy × Risk attitude     0.20 0.12 0.09 † 
Self-efficacy × Risk attitude     0.01 0.13 0.92  
Direct implementation costs × Risk attitude     –0.05 0.14 0.72  
Relationship costs × Risk attitude     0.14 0.14 0.31  
Response efficacy × Control appraisal     –0.10 0.11 0.36  
Self-efficacy × Control appraisal     –0.09 0.12 0.47  
Direct implementation costs × Control appraisal     0.26 0.13 0.06 † 
Relationship costs × Control appraisal     0.33 0.13 0.01 ** 
Response efficacy × Experience     –0.20 0.11 0.07 † 
Self-efficacy × Experience     –0.05 0.13 0.71  
Direct implementation costs × Experience     –0.14 0.14 0.32  
Relationship costs × Experience     0.14 0.13 0.30  
Utility from not taking proactive action          
Constant  1.31 0.13 0.00 *** 1.33 0.13 0.00 *** 
Log likelihood –998.09 *** –975.50 *** 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) 2012.20  1999.00  
McFadden’s Pseudo R2 0.10  0.12  
Note. Prop. refers to proposition, β to estimated coefficients, and SE to standard error. Both models were 
estimated in NLOGIT 6 using full information maximum likelihood estimators based on 1089 
observations (121 participants × 9 choice sets). The variables proactive personality, risk attitude, control 
appraisal, and experience have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of the estimated effects. 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed). 
As a robustness check, a further MNL model was estimated that specifically 
controlled for effects of the selected language (English/ German) on the relative 
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importance of proactive action attributes. Although results slightly changed 
quantitatively, interpretations remained qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 5. 
Coping Appraisal Variables. All the attributes used to construct proactive response 
options (response efficacy, self-efficacy, direct implementation costs, and relationship 
costs) showed a statistically significant effect on the decision between different types of 
proactive actions. This lends empirical support for Propositions 1a, 1b, and 1c. As 
suggested by PMT, response efficacy (βREFF = 1.38, p < 0.001) and self-efficacy (βSEFF = 
1.60, p < 0.001) increase the probability of selecting a specific alternative, whereas direct 
implementation costs (βDICO = –1.94, p < 0.001) and relationship costs (βRECO = –1.71, p 
< 0.001) reduce the latter. The constant term in equation 4 captured alternative-specific 
effects of proactive action A compared to proactive action B and did not show a 
statistically significant effect on choice behavior (βASC = 0.18, p = 0.11) which strengthens 
the validity of the chosen experimental design, because a generic label was used for both 
of these response alternatives. The relative influence of specific components of the 
employed model is depicted in Figure 3. Following Verma et al. (2006), we set the most 
influential β-coefficient (i.e., direct implementation costs) equal to 1 and rescaled all 
remaining coefficients relative to it between 0 and 1. 
Figure 3: Relative importance of DCE response alternative variables 
 
Note. The highest coefficient (direct implementation costs) is set to 1. All other coefficients are rescaled 
accordingly. 
Individual Characteristics. The MNL also allowed for an analysis of further 
components that are assumed to affect an individual’s intention to take proactive action. 
All four included decision maker characteristics revealed (marginally) significant 
interaction effects with the relative importance of certain proactive action attributes, 
providing support for Propositions 3a-3d. The higher an individual’s proactive 
personality, the lower the importance of response efficacy (βREFF×PP = –0.33, p = 0.01) 
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and direct implementation costs (βDICO×PP = 0.29, p = 0.04) for the decision whether to 
engage in proactive action. Moreover, for more risk-seeking participants, the relative 
importance of response efficacy increased (βREFF×RISK = 0.20, p = 0.09). Finally, control 
appraisal reduced the impact of response costs (βDICO×CA = 0.26, p = 0.06; βRECO×CA = 
0.33, p = 0.01) on the choice of proactive action alternatives and higher experience 
resulted in a lower relative importance of response efficacy (βREFF×EXP = –0.20, p = 0.07).  
In addition, after participating in the DCE, the respondents were asked to directly 
rate the perceived relative importance of the four selected proactive action attributes. The 
results revealed that, in contrast to results of the DCE, the most influential attribute was 
perceived to be response efficacy (M = 6.33, SD = 0.77) followed by self-efficacy (M = 
5.21, SD = 1.32). Direct implementation costs (M = 4.94, SD = 1.34) and relationship 
costs (M = 4.52, SD = 1.46) were perceived as less important, as shown in Figure 4.5 
Figure 4: Perceived relative importance of DCE response alternative variables 
 
Vulnerability and Response Costs. As suggested in the second proposition, in 
addition to the main effects of the coping appraisal variables, vulnerability affected the 
relative importance of response costs in the selection of alternative proactive actions. 
When vulnerability is high, direct implementation costs (βDICO×VULN = 0.45, p = 0.02) and 
relationship costs (βRECO×VULN = 0.39, p = 0.02) of proactive response options are less 
important for the choice of a specific proactive action. 
                                                          
5 Pairwise comparisons revealed that, except for the mean difference between the relative importance of 
self-efficacy and direct implementation costs (p = 0.14), all mean differences were statistically significant 
(p < 0.05). 
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2.5 Discussion 
2.5.1 Theoretical implications 
This study has several important theoretical implications for decision making in the 
context of supply risks and disruptions. First, PMT has primarily been applied to health-
related threats that directly concern an individual. This research supports the idea that 
PMT is more widely applicable and an insightful framework for situations involving 
almost any kind of threat. Instead of using a threat to individuals that would involve direct 
emotional or physical harm, we applied PMT to investigate choice behavior of individuals 
facing a threat to an organization. As per our propositions, the DCE revealed that trade-
offs are made in supply risk management to select the most attractive proactive measures. 
All main variables of PMT’s coping appraisal showed statistically significant effects on 
the participants’ choice behavior. The estimated utility that individuals obtain from 
evaluating the supply disruption scenario and potential proactive measures is an indicator 
of their protection motivation.  
As shown in Figure 3, the most important variables when selecting proactive 
measures in supply risk management are the two types of response costs variables. High 
direct implementation or relationship costs can render a proactive measure so unappealing 
that even high response efficacy or high self-efficacy alone cannot offset this burden. The 
DCE results, nevertheless, emphasize that self-efficacy is a crucial component that affects 
the behavior of individuals within organizations, as delineated by prior research 
(Bandura, 1977). Most surprisingly, the perceived effectiveness of a response alternative 
in mitigating future loss, which is the main aim of implementing proactive measures, has 
the lowest relative importance among the included attributes. Finally, although “doing 
nothing” might appear socially undesirable at first sight, the “no choice” option was the 
preferred choice in 51.2% of all 1089 choice sets in the final sample.  
Second, the role of individual characteristics in the DCE and subsequent analyses 
demonstrate that there is a need to account for the role of individuals within decision 
making processes in supply chain risk management. Figure 5 shows an enriched version 
of PMT, which includes an additional layer depicting the identified interactions of coping 
appraisals with individual-specific characteristics as a more comprehensive model of 
proactive behavior. 
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Proactive personality, risk attitude, control appraisal, and experience had 
statistically significant effects on the relative importance of certain proactive action 
attributes. Moreover, the results of this study imply that the components of PMT differ 
regarding their relative importance. Figure 3 shows that a surprising result of the DCE is 
that both types of response costs emerged as more decisive variables in determining 
whether to proactively mitigate future losses than, for instance, the response efficacy of 
a specific action. 
Figure 5: Enriched model of protection motivation theory 
 
Third, the insights generated reveal that the perception of decision makers about the 
relative importance of certain attributes of a proactive action deviates considerably from 
their actual choice behavior. For instance, although our participants perceived a proactive 
action’s effectiveness as most decisive for their choice, they subconsciously assigned 
considerably less importance to it when actually selecting an action. This is an important 
issue, which could be the result of an overly strong focus on costs that supply chain 
professionals are not aware of. Our study is, to the best of our knowledge, among the first 
efforts to empirically identify mismatches between perceptions and actual behavior of 
professionals in the context of procurement and underlines the need for decision makers 
to better understand their own choice behavior.  
Fourth, the DCE data revealed that the characteristics of a threat affect the relative 
importance of specific attributes of response alternatives. The effect of direct 
implementation costs on the behavior of individuals depends on the vulnerability to a 
threat. As can be inferred from Figure 3, direct implementation costs have a smaller 
impact on the selection of specific proactive measures in scenarios where the vulnerability 
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to a threat is high rather than low. This is intuitive in the sense that greater vulnerability 
might lead to a greater tolerance for higher response costs because, in this case, a threat 
arising from a supply disruption could appear more unavoidable. 
2.5.2 Managerial implications 
In addition to the delineated theoretical implications, this study’s findings entail 
considerable implications for managerial practice.  One implication of this study is the 
way in which individuals process insights from observing competitors exposed to supply 
disruptions to adjust their own management of supply risk. Prior research has already 
suggested that vicarious learning is a relevant issue in the management of supply risk and 
disruptions (Hora & Klassen, 2013). We contribute to these insights by adding new details 
on how exactly information on someone else’s misfortune and an impending disruption 
can be translated into proactive action. 
Individual managers focus on the costs of a specific action when they decide 
whether or not to act proactively, although they perceive self-efficacy and the action’s 
effectiveness as more important. This mismatch between perceptions and actual behavior 
underlines the need for decision makers to improve their understanding of how they make 
choices. Moreover, although the DCE focused on the example of a severe disruption that 
might lead to tremendous (financial) loss, the costs of a measure instead of its ability to 
mitigate future loss were extremely decisive for individual decision makers. This might 
reveal a tendency to admit too much relevance to the costs of a response in the selection 
process of proactive measures which might not always be desirable. The estimated loss 
associated with a supply disruption is often difficult to discern; this makes it challenging 
to weigh the costs of a proactive measure against the potential damage. 
Finally, in supply risk management, firms depend to a large part on the self-efficacy 
of their employees (as seen in Figures 3 and 4), which is even more important than the 
perceived effectiveness of a response option in avoiding the dangers of a threat. Hence, 
firms benefit from being aware of this circumstance and training their employees to 
appropriately assess their own abilities and build confidence. Otherwise, a manager who, 
mistakenly, does not feel capable of successfully performing a certain proactive action 
will avoid selecting it, which might result in an unnecessarily high exposure to future 
damage through supply disruptions for a firm. In addition, the results depict several 
Supply disruptions and protection motivation: Why some managers act proactively (and others don’t) 32 
 
effects of individual characteristics on proactive behavior. Thus, these insights might be 
helpful in recruiting decisions and personnel allocation. 
2.5.3 Limitations and future research opportunities 
Several limitations constrain the contribution of this study, but, at the same time, also 
highlight fruitful avenues for future research. First and foremost, the choice experiment 
relies on stated intentions of individuals instead of their real-life behavior. Prior research 
indicates that intentions can be reliable indicators of actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991; T. L. 
Webb & Sheeran, 2006). However, in the event of an actual impending supply disruption, 
individuals might behave differently than indicated in response to the hypothetical choice 
situation, such as environmental factors or time pressures unaccounted for in our DCE. 
Furthermore, the experimental task is limited to decision makers with centralized 
authority because we assume that this is a basic characteristic of risk management 
processes. This means that, at the same time, we did not consider many factors that might 
also influence the selection process of proactive measures, such as the presence of a 
hierarchy (Mihm, Loch, Wilkinson, & Huberman, 2010), the need to coordinate with 
others (Lounamaa & March, 1987), or adding other characteristics of an individual 
manager’s work environment (S. K. Parker et al., 2006).  
Following previous research, we refrained from explicitly distinguishing response 
costs and probable extrinsic as well as intrinsic rewards from maladaptive behavior. 
However, since these rewards are part of the PMT’s threat appraisal process, the 
consideration and implementation of specific rewards of, for example, not taking 
proactive action within an experimental design might provide an even more sophisticated 
picture of proactive risk management decisions. In addition, we used four two-level key 
variables of PMT as attributes to construct response options. As this was the first attempt 
to model the selection process of proactive actions in supply risk management using 
discrete choice modelling, this study has an exploratory character and adding attributes 
or distinguishing among further levels to describe response alternatives in the DCE seems 
a promising way to generate additional insights. 
Another limitation is that choice behavior might vary with the cultural background 
of respondents as demonstrated by S. C. Schneider and De Meyer (1991). They showed 
that Latin European managers were more likely to respond proactively to strategic issues 
than their North American, British, northern European, or Nordic counterparts. Hence, to 
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make the generated insights more generalizable, we encourage the validation of our 
results by means of a larger sample comprising supply chain professionals from several 
cultural regions. 
The identification of the main drivers of proactive behavior in supply risk 
management provides insights into decision making behavior. The results of this study 
show that PMT is an insightful framework to analyze the selection of proactive measures. 
Moreover, the identified mismatch between perceptions and actual choice behavior is an 
interesting topic for future research. The designed DCE can serve as a starting point for 
future research to further improve our understanding of how managers cope with the 
threat of supply disruptions and for practitioners to develop training tools for proactive 
decision making in supply risk management.  
Finally, this research focused on supply disruptions that are accompanied by a 
potentially severe negative impact on the performance of a firm and cannot be solved 
within day-to-day operations. Choice behavior and the underlying relative importance of 
specific attributes might considerably diverge between exposure to less severe instead of 
very severe threats, as already suggested by prior research (Cismaru & Lavack, 2007). It 
is important to understand the performance implications of these choices when the threat 
is minor and severe. 
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Chapter 3 Substantive and symbolic corporate 
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Abstract 
Often, corporate social responsibility (CSR) is associated solely with “doing good,” but 
firms also have to prevent corporate social irresponsibility (CSIR) (i.e., “avoiding bad”). 
Many firms engage in CSR – either substantively or only symbolically – in the hopes that 
a reputation for CSR mitigates negative stakeholder reactions in case the firms suddenly 
become involved in a CSIR incident. Yet, research on the effects of a CSR reputation on 
stakeholder reactions to CSIR is equivocal. Some studies have theorized insurance-like 
effects of ex ante CSR, whereas others have suggested the exact opposite, namely that a 
reputation for CSR may even aggravate negative reactions to CSIR. Moreover, extant 
research on stakeholder reactions to CSIR has focused chiefly on consumers and 
investors, although stakeholders increasingly hold firms accountable for misconduct 
within their supply chains, which has repercussions on supplier selection decisions. The 
present study is innovative in that it focuses on the business-to-business (B2B) context 
from a purchasing perspective and proposes a model that explains the conditions under 
which CSR acts as an insurance or a liability subsequent to CSIR. The empirical results 
from a vignette experiment with supply chain managers add to the understanding of the 
effects of CSR activities on negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR and provide important 
theoretical and practical implications.  
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3.1 Introduction 
The issue of corporate social irresponsibility (CSIR) has only rarely been addressed in 
the corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature, although stakeholders devote growing 
attention to environmental and social misconduct (Fiaschi et al., 2017). Stakeholders exert 
increased pressure on firms to behave in socially responsible ways (Campbell, 2007) and 
increasingly hold them responsible for misconduct in their supply chains (Hartmann & 
Moeller, 2014; Y. H. Kim & Davis, 2016). The academic literature has strongly focused 
on linking CSR with the concept of “doing good,” while “avoiding bad” also constitutes 
an important condition for firms to be perceived as socially responsible (Lin-Hi & Müller, 
2013). CSIR applies to all industries and it can take various forms from environmental 
disasters (e.g., the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010) and workplace disasters (e.g., the 
Rana Plaza building collapse in 2013) all the way to corruption and collusion scandals 
(e.g., the price-fixing cartel of the truck makers DAF, Daimler, Iveco, and Volvo-Renault 
between 1997 and 2011). The globalization of markets and increasing interconnectedness 
of supply networks have recently added to the complexity that firms face and made it 
even more challenging for managers to prevent CSIR. In the light of this development, it 
is important to understand that consumers not only blame firms for CSIR that occurs 
inside their own barriers but also hold buying firms responsible for their suppliers’ 
environmental and social misconduct (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). Subsequent negative 
stakeholder reactions pose substantial risks that need to be addressed (Lin-Hi & 
Blumberg, 2018). Since firms are perceived to be only as responsible as their supply 
network (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009), the purchasing function plays a key role in 
preventing CSIR and addressing these risks. This study focusses on the role of the 
purchasing function as gatekeeper to CSIR in the supply chain of the focal firm. 
Research has been concerned with whether a firm’s ex ante CSR activities affect 
negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR. Most studies have focused on consumer or 
investor reactions and theorized an insurance-like mechanism of a firm’s reputation for 
CSR, which builds a “reservoir of goodwill” among the firm’s stakeholders and mitigates 
negative responses to bad news (e.g., Flammer, 2013; Godfrey et al., 2009). But there are 
also studies purporting the exact opposite, namely that firms engaging in CSR experience 
more negative reactions to CSIR incidents than firms that do not promote themselves as 
socially responsible (e.g., Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; Swaen & Vanhamme, 2003; 
Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009). Indeed, recent examples, such as the German car 
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manufacturer Volkswagen (VW) that won numerous CSR awards but currently faces 
severe public criticism due to the “Dieselgate” scandal, cast doubts on insurance-like 
effects of ex ante CSR (Lynn, 2015). 
Like brand commitment or consumer-company identification, a CSR reputation 
might serve as a goodwill buffer in case of non-severe CSIR, but also an expectation 
burden in case of severe CSIR (e.g., Einwiller, Fedorikhin, Johnson, & Kamins, 2006; 
Germann et al., 2014; Janssen et al., 2015; Kang et al., 2016). Based on assimilation-
contrast theory, this research contributes to identifying the boundary conditions of the 
“insurance effect” of a CSR reputation thereby addressing recent calls for more research 
on how ex ante CSR affects negative stakeholder reactions in the aftermath of CSIR (e.g., 
Kang et al., 2016; S. Kim & Choi, 2016; Lenz, Wetzel, & Hammerschmidt, 2017). More 
specifically, this study investigates how negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR in 
industrial buying contexts are shaped by the type of CSR reputation and the CSIR 
severity. To this end, the employed research design (randomized vignette experiment) 
accounts for different approaches to build a CSR reputation (substantive vs. symbolic). 
The empirical results suggest that CSR mitigates negative reactions to non-severe CSIR 
but that CSR reputations driven by symbolic actions aggravate negative stakeholder 
reactions in case of severe CSIR. In addition, the results provide important and innovative 
insights for managers who are concerned with stakeholder management and the allocation 
of resources to CSR activities while facing the risk of CSIR. 
3.2 Conceptual background and hypotheses development 
3.2.1 Substantive and symbolic management of corporate social responsibility 
expectations 
Although the literature on CSR is vast, there are still controversies revolving around the 
definition of CSR (e.g., Colombo, Guerci, & Miandar, 2017; Sheehy, 2015). As Lin-Hi 
and Müller (2013) stated, “despite the growing interest in this topic, there is still no 
general agreement on the precise meaning of CSR” (p. 1928). CSR has often been used 
as an umbrella term for concepts, such as sustainability, business ethics, or corporate 
citizenship (de Jong & van der Meer, 2017; Freeman & Hasnaoui, 2011). Nevertheless, 
the accepted idea of CSR is that society and business are not autonomous but 
interdependent and that “society has certain expectations for appropriate business 
behavior and outcomes” (Wood, 1991, p. 695). For the purpose of this study, following 
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McWilliams and Siegel (2001), we define CSR as a firm’s actions that appear to “advance 
some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and what is required by the law” (p. 
117). Moreover, we adopt a holistic, multidimensional view of CSR. Typically, 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activities are captured to determine the 
degree to which a firm lives up to its CSR (Arvidsson, 2010; Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 
2014). Examples of such activities include the use of renewable raw materials (Ketola, 
2010), the establishment of corporate foundations (Westhues & Einwiller, 2006), and the 
presence of an external auditor to examine, verify, and validate a CSR report (Lynes & 
Andrachuk, 2008). However, research concerned with CSR has often focused only on 
single dimensions (e.g., Walls, Berrone, & Phan, 2012) and neglected this 
multidimensionality (e.g., Bénabou & Tirole, 2010; Carroll, 1979; Waddock & Graves, 
1997). 
Firms may establish and maintain a reputation for CSR by engaging in CSR-related 
activities (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009). More specifically, 
from a stakeholder perspective, firms have to address their stakeholders’ demands, such 
as customers, suppliers, employees, or local communities, who have expectations with 
regard to a firm’s social responsibility. A firm can obtain support for its operations and, 
from an institutional perspective, maintain its “social license to operate” (SLO) 
(Demuijnck & Fasterling, 2016, p. 675) only when the behavior of a firm is in line with 
these demands. In addition, buying firms are increasingly held responsible for their 
suppliers’ behavior and criticized as soon as this behavior deviates from the stakeholders’ 
expectations (Hartmann & Moeller, 2014). This “chain liability” adds to the challenge of 
maintaining an SLO, because it implies that a buying firm is only as socially responsible 
as its supply network (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; Krause, Vachon, & Klassen, 
2009). Consequently, the purchasing function plays a key role in implementing a firm’s 
CSR strategy by mitigating risks associated with environmental or social misconduct of 
suppliers (Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2016; L. Schneider & Wallenburg, 2012). 
An SLO provides a basis for firm’s activities to be perceived as legitimate in the 
eyes of stakeholders (Demuijnck & Fasterling, 2016). Legitimacy is typically defined as 
“a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). According to institutional theory, firms can use two 
strategies to address their stakeholders’ demands and obtain legitimacy. They can pursue 
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either a substantive or a symbolic adaptation approach (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). From a 
stakeholder management perspective, the overall aim of these approaches is to manage 
stakeholders’ perceptions of meeting societal expectations by either engaging in actions 
entailing real change or claims/ promises providing representations of such actions 
(Wickert, Scherer, & Spence, 2016). Highhouse, Brooks, and Gregarus (2009) developed 
a model showing that these activities serve as cues about a firm’s CSR policy, which are 
processed by individuals to form a perception about a firm’s reputation. 
The substantive adaptation approach involves considerable changes in core 
procedures or long-term investments, which entail certain risks but ensure actual 
compliance with the expectations imposed by the external environment (Eccles, Ioannou, 
& Serafeim, 2014). Substantive actions include, for example, the use of renewable energy, 
the development of products that provide specific health or safety benefits, and the 
acquisition of an above-average percentage of independent board members. In contrast, 
the symbolic adaptation approach is based on activities that seek to decouple the firm’s 
actual practices from the external demands by means of superficial actions that merely 
show “ceremonial conformity” but do not necessarily have any substance (Ashforth & 
Gibbs, 1990; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Examples are the formation of a CSR committee, 
a membership in a voluntary initiative that aims to reduce CO2 emissions, and the mere 
claim to provide flexible working hours to employees. These actions do not necessarily 
entail real and concrete change in business processes, but they have the potential to be 
utilized as a cover for poor actual CSR performance (Russo & Harrison, 2005). Symbolic 
responses to stakeholder demands aim at producing “impressions of more material 
change” (Durand, Hawn, & Ioannou, 2017, p. 5) and managing stakeholder perceptions 
of environmental and social commitment (Bansal & Clelland, 2004). Despite the 
circumstance that symbolic activities do not involve concrete changes in organizational 
procedures, they may suffice to promote a firm’s legitimacy because the “appearance 
rather than the fact of conformity is often presumed to be sufficient for the attainment of 
legitimacy” (Oliver, 1991, p. 155). In line with this, several empirical studies have 
suggested that the use of symbolic CSR actions, decoupled from concrete change, 
positively affects a firm’s legitimacy (e.g., Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999; Westphal 
& Zajac, 2001; Zott & Huy, 2007). However, although both substantive and symbolic 
CSR engagement may translate into being perceived as legitimate, further empirical 
research shows that substantive and symbolic CSR activities may differ with regard to 
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their implications for stakeholder attributions and behavior (e.g., Donia, Ronen, Sirsly, & 
Bonaccio, 2017; Godfrey et al., 2009; McShane & Cunningham, 2012; Vlachos, 
Panagopoulos, & Rapp, 2013). 
It is not surprising that, all else equal, managers tend to prefer to pursue the less 
time-consuming and resource-intensive stakeholder management via symbolic 
assurances (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). This preference for symbolic assurances carries a 
risk, because stakeholders typically demand substantive action. If noticed, the use of 
symbols, claims, and promises without actually providing a social good could lead to a 
loss of all benefits generated from previous CSR activities (Hawn & Ioannou, 2016). If 
symbolic CSR actions were interpreted as “greenwashing” for the mere sake of being 
granted legitimacy, firms may be perceived as untrustworthy and manipulative (Walker 
& Wan, 2012). Being one of the most prominent industry examples of the last decades, 
British Petroleum’s (BP) symbolic commitment to CSR before the Deepwater Horizon 
catastrophe highlights that such decoupling can be enough to obtain legitimacy. However, 
this example also highlights that whether substantive or symbolic activities have been 
chosen to achieve legitimacy has important repercussions in case of severe misconduct 
because the “beyond petroleum” campaign based on symbolic CSR engagement first 
helped BP to be perceived as socially responsible, “before being turned against it as a 
testament of perceived greenwashing” (Matejek & Gössling, 2014, p. 579). 
3.2.2 Corporate social irresponsibility 
The examination of CSIR in the academic literature started with Armstrong (1977) and 
the topic has been only rarely addressed since, although “avoiding bad” is considered a 
precondition for a firm to be perceived as a responsible actor (Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013). In 
line with Lin-Hi and Müller (2013), we define CSIR as firm-induced incident “that results 
in (potential) disadvantages and/ or harm to other actors” (p. 1932). This includes, for 
instance, the release of toxic chemicals into waterways (Greenpeace, 2014), corruption 
scandals (Clark, 2010), and labor law violations (Reuters, 2014). Such events are frequent 
and widespread across industries, and the probability of the occurrence of CSIR is a 
function of the complexity of a firm’s business (Vanessa, Jijun, & Bansal, 2006). CSIR 
incidents may trigger various consequential negative stakeholder reactions such as 
penalties, compensation payments, sales bans, and decreased employee motivation, but 
also reputational damage and customer losses, which can even lead to the demise of firms 
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(e.g., Jin, 2016; Sims & Brinkmann, 2003). To manage the risk of CSIR in their supply 
chains and curb the chain liability effect, firms can choose from a broad range of actions 
to respond to misconduct of suppliers. Contractual agreements between a focal firm and 
its suppliers (e.g., phase-out of a supplier instead of immediate termination of the 
relationship) might constrain these response actions. 
Many firms pursue CSR-related actions in the belief that this protects them from 
future reputational damage (Janssen et al., 2015; Vanhamme, Swaen, Berens, & Janssen, 
2015). Still, several industry examples of CSIR have demonstrated that the effects of a 
reputation for CSR on stakeholder reactions to irresponsible behavior are more complex 
than a simple “insurance mechanism” would suggest. VW was highly praised for its 
strong commitment to CSR until the public was informed that in fall 2015 that the firm 
cheated on the pollution tests of their diesel vehicles by using an illegally manipulating 
software. This scandal has already cost VW several billions of U.S. dollars, but the 
corresponding negative consequences might still not be discernible to the full extent. The 
firm has been heavily criticized in public, although other car manufacturers were, and still 
are, exposed to similar accusations (Mehrotra, 2018). Another example concerns the 
“Deepwater Horizon” oil spill of BP. For years prior to the disaster, BP has spent many 
resources on its “Beyond Petroleum” campaign to be perceived as a socially responsible 
firm. Nevertheless, the firm has suffered tremendously from the disaster in 2010. It is 
argued that a driver of the stakeholder criticism was the firm’s CSR engagement prior to 
the event (Janssen et al., 2015). 
Moreover, several published studies obtained results that the “insurance 
mechanism” is not able to explain. These studies suggest that under certain conditions, 
mitigating effects resulting from a CSR reputation are fragile, and ex ante CSR 
engagement may even lead to more negative stakeholder reactions subsequent to CSIR 
compared to firms that do not have a CSR reputation. For instance, if the domain of the 
CSIR incident is related to a firm’s prior CSR activities, a CSR reputation acts as a 
liability that aggravates negative reactions (Wagner, Lutz, & Weitz, 2009). The recent 
study by S. Kim and Choi (2016) complements this finding, demonstrating that the effect 
of post-crisis communication of CSR activities on negative stakeholder reactions depends 
on the domain of pre-crisis CSR initiatives conducted by the firm facing the crisis. The 
domain of a firm’s post-crisis CSR engagement is also decisive for its implications on 
firm value. If the engagement is related to the domain of a firm’s CSIR, it is perceived as 
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insincere while it may enhance firm value if it is related to other domains (Lenz et al., 
2017). In addition, it is important to consider the channels through which firms 
communicate CSR activities prior to CSIR, especially when these activities do not relate 
to the domain of the CSIR incident. CSR activities that are communicated through highly 
credible third-party sources augment negative stakeholder reactions while CSR 
information that is communicated using firm-controlled sources is able to attenuate 
adverse responses compared to firms that do not at all communicate their CSR activities 
(Vanhamme et al., 2015). Finally, the results of an experimental study revealed that firms 
with a brief CSR history may experience more negative stakeholder reactions to corporate 
crises when they use their CSR engagement in their post-CSIR communication, whereas 
firms with a long CSR history can benefit from mentioning their involvement 
(Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009). All these research efforts highlight that insurance-like 
effects from ex ante CSR cannot be taken for granted. 
3.2.3 Assimilation and contrast effects subsequent to CSIR 
Previous research has strongly focused on theorizing an insurance-like mechanism of a 
firm’s reputation for CSR in case of misconduct, however, the boundary conditions of 
insurance-like effects of ex ante CSR on negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR remain 
unclear. CSR-related activities do not necessarily need to translate into positive effects 
for a firm, especially if this involvement is perceived as insincere (Sen & Bhattacharya, 
2001). When a firm with a reputation for CSR is involved in CSIR, customers can lose 
their more positive perception and trust this firm less than if it would have not been 
promoted as socially responsible (Swaen & Vanhamme, 2003).  
Assimilation-contrast theory describes how individuals evaluate new information. 
Its underlying idea is that an individual’s initial expectations towards an issue serve as a 
reference point to which the new information is compared (Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 
1957; Sherif & Hovland, 1961). Depending on the extent to which the new information 
violates the initial expectations, the disparity will either be assimilated towards the 
reference point or contrasted away from it. In line with this, Kang et al. (2016) argued 
that in a fashion similar to that of brand commitment in case of product recalls (Germann 
et al., 2014) or consumer-company identification in times of negative publicity (Einwiller 
et al., 2006), a reputation for CSR might attenuate negative stakeholders’ reactions to 
light, non-severe CSIR but augment negative responses to severe CSIR. Put differently, 
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stakeholders might respond more negatively to severe CSIR than if they would have not 
perceived this firm as socially responsible. Based on insights from research on 
assimilation-contrast theory (e.g., R. E. Anderson, 1973), the framework for 
understanding the roles of CSR in crisis situations developed by Janssen et al. (2015) 
suggests that assimilation and contrast effects are not only driven by the characteristics 
of CSIR (e.g., its severity) but also by stakeholder perceptions of CSR motives. These 
motives are either extrinsic (akin to symbolic CSR) or intrinsic (akin to substantive CSR). 
Intrinsically motivated CSR engagement is perceived as acting out of profit-driven self-
interest while extrinsically motivated CSR activities are interpreted as genuine concern 
for environmental and social concerns (Batson, 1998). Assimilation-contrast theory 
provides valuable insight into how reputations for CSR affect negative stakeholder 
reactions to CSIR and, more specifically, into the boundary conditions of the insurance- 
like mechanism of ex ante CSR. 
To operationalize the reactions of customers to CSIR, we focus on two important 
customer outcomes of buying situations, purchase intention (PI) and the intention to 
engage in negative word-of-mouth (nWOM) (Maxham & Netemeyer, 2003). They cover 
two facets of customer behavior, and they are well-established and validated in the B2B 
marketing literature (Leroi-Werelds, Streukens, Brady, & Swinnen, 2014). Purchase 
intentions depict how a customer intends to act in a specific buying situation while 
intentions to engage in nWOM represent customers’ behavior after the buying situation. 
Two unique characteristics distinguish nWOM from purchase intentions, the effect of 
nWOM tends to last longer and nWOM is a potential source of information (Ham & Kim, 
2017). Hence, nWOM can have tremendous consequences and may affect the purchase 
decisions of not only a supplier’s existing, but also potential customers (Ferguson & 
Johnston, 2011; Money, Gilly, & Graham, 1998). In industrial buying contexts, nWOM 
could be shared through, for instance, supplier-selected referrals (Hada, Grewal, & Lilien, 
2014). Industrial buyers tend to rely on referrals even more than consumers (Wangenheim 
& Bayón, 2007) and considerable empirical evidence shows that both purchase intention 
and nWOM are related to actual behavior (E. W. Anderson, Fornell, & Lehmann, 1994; 
Morgan & Rego, 2006). A joint focus on both variables captures a thorough picture of 
the behavior of professional buyers. 
As an important characteristic of CSIR, the severity of environmental or social 
misconduct might moderate the link between CSIR and negative stakeholder reactions. 
Substantive and symbolic corporate social responsibility: Blessing or curse in case of misconduct? 43 
 
CSIR of low severity could result in assimilation effects if a firm has had a reputation for 
CSR prior to the incident. In this case, the disparity between a stakeholder’s expectations 
and the firm’s true CSR performance might be small enough to be tolerated and 
assimilated towards the more positive initial perception by stakeholders. Assimilation-
contrast theory suggests that these assimilation effects lead to more favorable stakeholder 
reactions than if a firm would have not positioned itself as socially responsible. In 
addition, since non-severe CSIR does not fundamentally call into question a firm’s 
reputation for CSR and its corresponding motives (Janssen et al., 2015), both substantive 
and symbolic CSR are expected to produce these insurance-like effects. Hence, to 
investigate whether firms with reputations for substantive or symbolic CSR will 
experience assimilation effects that attenuate negative stakeholder reactions in case of 
non-severe CSIR, we hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1. If a firm with a reputation for substantive CSR is involved in non-
severe CSIR, it experiences smaller negative effects on its customers’ 
(a) purchase intention and 
(b) intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth 
than firms that do not have a reputation for CSR. 
Hypothesis 2. If a firm with a reputation for symbolic CSR is involved in non-
severe CSIR, it experiences smaller negative effects on its customers’ 
(a) purchase intention and 
(b) intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth 
than firms that do not have a reputation for CSR. 
According to assimilation-contrast theory, thresholds exist for both acceptance and 
rejection and stakeholders will not accept a further increase in disparity beyond the 
threshold of acceptance; therefore, severe CSIR that considerably fails to meet a 
stakeholder’s initial expectations based on a firm’s ex ante CSR reputation might result 
in contrast effects. We argue that this might not always be true. In the context of CSR, 
the effectiveness of a firm’s actions used to be perceived as socially responsible can 
depend on their nature. Previous research has highlighted that substantive and symbolic 
CSR activities do not necessarily affect stakeholder reactions similarly (e.g., Donia et al., 
2017; Hawn & Ioannou, 2012). More specifically, in case of considerable violations of 
prior expectations, it does matter for stakeholders whether legitimacy was achieved by 
engaging mainly in symbolic rather than substantive CSR activities (Carlos & Lewis, 
2018; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). Symbolic 
CSR actions can be perceived as an ineffective attempt to meet stakeholder expectations 
when the disparity between expected and true performance is large. If identified as 
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extrinsically-motivated greenwashing, symbolic management is likely to be punished 
(Forehand & Grier, 2003; Janssen et al., 2015). 
Accordingly, for severe CSIR incidents, we argue that firms which have established 
a reputation for CSR driven by symbolic engagement will experience more negative 
stakeholder reactions compared to firms, which have no CSR reputation (all else being 
equal). The underlying logic is that the CSIR incident creates a large disparity in the 
stakeholder expectations formed by a firm’s CSR reputation, which leads to contrast 
effects. Hence, the customer magnifies the perceived disparity between the incident and 
the initial expectations and reacts even more negatively to the incident than if the firm 
would have not promoted itself as socially responsible. Prior research has suggested that 
in visibly polluting industries, CSR engagement can harm corporate financial 
performance (Walker & Wan, 2012). Strong and clear negative information concerning a 
CSIR incident puts in doubt the credibility of ex ante CSR engagement and erodes the 
overall legitimacy of the firm maneuvering a firm in a worse position than if stakeholders 
had no information about its CSR activities (Yoon, Gürhan‐Canli, & Schwarz, 2006). 
Firms that have established a CSR reputation based on substantive engagement are 
likely to experience more favorable blame attributions about crisis responsibility since 
their CSR motives are perceived to be intrinsically motivated. Extant empirical research 
highlights that, even in case of severe incidents, stakeholders will be more likely to 
attribute CSIR to bad luck rather than malevolence or develop alternative explanations if 
stakeholders believe in intrinsic CSR motives (Godfrey et al., 2009; Minor & Morgan, 
2011). Accordingly, we propose: 
Hypothesis 3. If a firm with a reputation for substantive CSR is involved in severe 
CSIR, it experiences smaller negative effects on its customers’ 
(a) purchase intention and 
(b) intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth 
than firms that do not have a reputation for CSR. 
Hypothesis 4. If a firm with a reputation for symbolic CSR is involved in severe 
CSIR, it experiences larger negative effects on its customers’ 
(a) purchase intention and 
(b) intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth 
than firms that do not have a reputation for CSR. 
3.3 Method 
We used a vignette-based experimental approach to test our hypotheses on the effect of a 
firm’s CSR reputation in the aftermath of CSIR in B2B contexts. A vignette is typically 
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defined as a “short, carefully constructed description of a person, object, or situation, 
representing a systematic combination of characteristics” (Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010, p. 
128). Recently, vignette-experiments have been employed in the operations management 
context to investigate make-or-buy decisions (Mantel, Tatikonda, & Liao, 2006), 
observational learning (Hora & Klassen, 2013), and perceptual differences between 
buyers and suppliers (Ro, Su, & Chen, 2016). 
This approach has several methodological advantages. First, vignette-based 
experiments provide a controlled test of the hypothesized causal relationships by carefully 
manipulating the vignettes presented to the participants. Second, compared to 
retrospective surveys or case studies, vignette-based experiments can generate more 
reliable data, because the participants have to indicate their intentions shortly after reading 
a specific scenario, which minimizes retrospective bias (Wathne, Biong, & Heide, 2001). 
Furthermore, given the sensitive nature of environmental and social misconduct, a 
vignette-based experimental design can minimize social desirability bias 
(Rungtusanatham et al., 2011; Wason et al., 2002). Third, an experimental design enables 
researchers to study behavior and choices where individuals or firms are usually not likely 
to share information (Rungtusanatham et al., 2011). A CSIR incident typically has 
adverse effects on firms. Moreover, severe incidents are rather rare, and it would be 
unethical to disrupt a firm to collect data. Vignette-based experiments help overcome both 
issues. 
We used an online experiment to maintain control over experimental conditions, 
especially since our participants are geographically dispersed. In addition, we integrated 
vignettes into a survey, as this is a promising but rarely applied approach to study 
respondents’ judgments and account for the shortcomings of each approach (Atzmüller 
& Steiner, 2010). By randomly assigning participants to treatment conditions, we 
eliminated systematic differences in the participants that might affect their responses 
(e.g., Bachrach & Bendoly, 2011). As a result, differences in response behavior can be 
attributed to the manipulated experimental treatments. 
3.3.1 Development of vignettes and experimental design 
We carefully constructed vignettes to assign the participants to a scenario in which they 
served as professional buyers who are considering buying a specific product from a 
potential supplier. Thereby, a projective technique – a form of indirect questioning from 
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the perspective of another person or group – was utilized to limit potential demand 
characteristics and effects of social desirability (Fisher, 1993). In line with the principle 
of form postponement, all vignettes contained the same introductory paragraph (common 
module) to ensure that all participants are provided with a similar contextual background 
(Rungtusanatham et al., 2011). 
Our factors of interest, CSR reputation and CSIR severity, were manipulated in a 
subsequent experimental cues module. All other factors of the vignettes were held 
constant. In total, using a 3 (CSR reputation: None, symbolic, or substantive) x 2 (CSIR 
severity: Low or high) full factorial design, six vignettes were created. After reading a 
vignette, the participants were asked to answer questions regarding their intentions and 
perception of the situation. Table 6 shows the descriptions of the vignette modules. 
We manipulated our factors of interest as follows. Information on the CSR 
reputation of the potential supplier was either not given (none), contained several 
symbolic activities (symbolic), or mentioned specific substantive activities (substantive). 
To differentiate between substantive and symbolic activities, we relied on Hawn and 
Ioannou (2012) and their categorization of 120 Thomson Reuters (ASSET4) items. 
Accordingly, a CSR reputation driven mainly by substantive activities was described by 
specific policies and quantitative indicators of CSR implementation, whereas claims and 
reports represented a CSR reputation driven mainly by symbolic activities. 
Each CSR reputation manipulation contained three specific actions. To capture 
CSR in a broad sense rather than focusing on one single dimension, each of these actions 
addressed one of the three CSR dimensions (environment, society, and governance). 
Additionally, both substantive and symbolic CSR reputations were highlighted by 
describing that the potential supplier achieved high CSR ratings and that the firms 
reported on how they either contribute to the general welfare of society (symbolic) or 
implement specific measures to increase the latter (substantive). 
In line with previous research, CSIR severity was manipulated by varying the effect 
of and damage caused by a specific event (e.g., Germann et al., 2014; Hartmann & 
Moeller, 2014). We illustrated the effect or damage associated with a CSIR incident by 
altering the number of people that were hurt or affected by a leak of ammonia at one of 
the supplier’s facilities. Ammonia leakages frequently occur in practice and vary in terms 
of the damage caused (e.g., Wong, 2013). We varied CSIR descriptions to distinguish 
between low and high severity. 
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Table 6: Vignette module text descriptions 
Introduction 
Mr. Müller is a professional buyer for the textile manufacturer TextileCorp. One of 
his responsibilities concerns buying textile printers which allow for a cost-effective 
application of color on textiles in specific patterns and designs. Due to difficulties 
with the former supplier for textile printers, Mr. Müller has been instructed to find 
and select a new one. He compares and analyzes the product offerings of several 
potential suppliers and receives corresponding quotations. Based on his analyses, the 
firm PrintInc is his favorite choice. 
Factor Manipulated factor levels 
CSR reputation 
Substantive Symbolic None 
PrintInc is well-known for its 
activities related to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and receives 
very good CSR ratings. To 
contribute to the welfare of society, 
PrintInc has implemented concrete 
and extensive measures. The firm 
uses ecological criteria in its 
supplier selection process, has an 
above-average share of female 
supervisory board members, and 
pursues a clear strategy to improve 
the work-life-balance of its 
employees. 
PrintInc is well-known for its 
activities related to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) and receives 
very good CSR ratings. PrintInc 
reports about its engagement for the 
welfare of society. The firm 
publishes a CSR report on an annual 
basis, is a member of an initiative to 
reduce CO2 emissions, and claims 
to strictly control for compliance 
with human rights inside of its own 
supply chain. 
(–) 
CSIR severity 
High Low 
After Mr. Müller identified PrintInc as 
his favorite supplier, it became publicly 
known that there was an incident at one 
of PrintInc’s factories. Due to 
insufficient safety precautions, large 
amounts of ammonia leaked into the air. 
Six employees died at the scene. 25 other 
employees, as well as a number of local 
residents which lived nearby, had to be 
taken to hospital because of massive 
respiratory problems and serious 
cauterization of their airways. 
After Mr. Müller identified PrintInc as 
his favorite supplier, it became publicly 
known that there was an incident at one 
of PrintInc’s factories. Due to 
insufficient safety precautions, very 
small amounts of ammonia leaked into 
the air. Two employees complained of 
minor respiratory problems. At no point 
of time were residents of this area in 
danger. 
Note. The table shows translations; the original language was German. 
As Wason et al. (2002) recommended, the vignettes were pre-tested with 61 
students to assess their validity, internal consistency, and realism. The development of 
two different vignette versions ensured that the distinction between substantive and 
symbolic CSR was independent of specific semantics or CSR activities and that the CSIR 
incident selected was realistic. The two vignette versions differed regarding the depicted 
CSIR incident (version 1: Ammonia leak, version 2: Immoral surveillance of employees) 
and the delineated CSR activities for substantive and symbolic CSR reputations. The 
students were randomly assigned to two vignettes (one out of six per vignette version). 
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After reading a vignette, the students were supposed to indicate their purchase intention 
(PI) and intention to engage in nWOM. 
In addition, the students responded to manipulation check items to ensure that the 
representations of different levels of CSR reputation and CSIR severity were appropriate. 
For both vignette versions, the mean responses differed significantly across different 
levels of our manipulated variables. In the pre-test, the students also rated the degree of 
realism of the vignettes on a seven-point scale (1 = “not at all” to 7 = “totally”). The 
results suggested that the scenarios appeared realistic and the six different vignettes of 
version 1 were perceived as slightly more realistic compared to the vignettes of version 
2. The mean responses to the six different vignettes of version 1 ranged from 4.8 to 6.1 
(5.6 on average) while the means for those of version 2 ranged from 4.4 to 6.0 (5.2 on 
average). Consequently, vignette version 1 was selected for data collection. Minor 
modifications after the pre-test refined the clarity and wording of manipulations. 
3.3.2 Study participants 
Between March and June 2017, the data were collected by means of a self-administered 
online experiment. Contact addresses were obtained from a commercial business data 
provider. The participants of our experiment were full-time working professionals with 
direct experience in supply chain management working for firms from 15 different 
industries in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. The subjects received an invitation via 
e-mail and they were randomly assigned to one of the six treatment conditions. Out of the 
1064 managers invited, 153 managers (16.3% female) completed the experiment, 
resulting in an effective response rate of 14.4%. Inconsistent participation duration led to 
the exclusion of five observations. Box plots of the outcome variables showed 13 visible 
outliers (Tukey, 1977). In line with prior research (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Joo, 2013; 
Raaijmakers, Vermeulen, Meeus, & Zietsma, 2015), these were excluded from further 
analyses resulting in a full sample of 135 usable scenarios. On average, the participants 
had almost 17 years of experience in supply chain management (SD = 10.62). 
3.3.3 Measures 
We focused on two distinct customer outcomes as dependent variables, purchase 
intention and intention to engage in nWOM. The measures described in the following 
Substantive and symbolic corporate social responsibility: Blessing or curse in case of misconduct? 49 
 
subsection utilize seven-point rating scales (ranging from 1 := “not at all” to 7 := 
“totally”). 
Purchase intention (PI). Purchase decisions are typically binary, as one can either 
buy or not buy. The use of a binary variable in an experiment, however, results in a 
dependent variable with little variance to explain. This would considerably limit the 
ability to understand the effects of our independent variables on the participants’ 
intentions (McKelvie, Haynie, & Gustavsson, 2011). In line with previous research, we 
therefore operationalized PI as one of our dependent variables measured on a Likert-type 
scale and asked the participants to indicate how likely they would be to buy the respective 
product if they were the decision maker described in the scenario (e.g., Sen & 
Bhattacharya, 2001; Wilcox, Kim, & Sen, 2009). We thereby followed the 
recommendations to use single-item measures for doubly concrete constructs, such as PI 
(Bergkvist & Rossiter, 2007). Doubly concrete constructs have both a clear object (e.g., 
a product) and a single-meaning attribute (e.g., willingness to buy). 
Intention to engage in nWOM. As a further dependent variable, we measured the 
extent to which participants would be willing to engage in nWOM (M = 1.96, SD = 1.23; 
α = 0.82) after reading a given scenario (Richins, 1983; Singh, 1990). To this end, the 
participants responded to three items, which we adapted to our vignettes from recent 
research in the CSR context (Antonetti & Maklan, 2016). The three items reflect an 
individual’s willingness to spread negative information about the specific supplier 
involved in CSIR. 
Given the sensitivity of the investigated topic, and to be able to investigate the 
influence of personal attitudes towards CSR on the behavior of the participants, we also 
measured their level of CSR support (M = 5.15, SD = 1.12; α = 0.75) using an adapted 
five-item scale at the end of the experiment (e.g., Ramasamy, Yeung, & Au, 2010). The 
participants had to indicate the degree to which they were (1) willing to pay more to buy 
products from a socially responsible firm, (2) considering the ethical reputation of 
business when they shop, (3) avoiding to buy products from firms that have engaged in 
immoral actions, (4) willing to pay more to buy products of a company that shows 
engagement for the well-being of our society, and (5) willing to rather buy from a firm 
with a socially responsible reputation, if the price and quality of two products are similar. 
Finally, the respondents provided standard demographic information (gender), firm 
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related information (industry), and their experience in the field of supply chain 
management (in years). 
The psychometric properties of the two reflective scales (nWOM and CSR support) 
were assessed using a covariance-based confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The 
measurement model resulted in an acceptable fit to the data, given the relatively small 
sample size (Hair et al., 2009): χ2(19) = 45.76 with p = 0.001 (χ2/df = 2.41), CFI= 0.94, 
TLI = 0.91, SRMR = 0.083, and RMSEA = 0.102 (90% confidence interval CI = [0.065, 
0.140]). Moreover, all items showed large and statistically significant factor loadings on 
their hypothesized factor (p < 0.05 for all loadings). Composite reliability for both 
constructs (0.86 for nWOM and 0.75 for CSR support) exceeded the cut-off value of 0.70. 
The average variance extracted (AVE) values were 0.67 for nWOM and 0.42 for CSR 
support; thus, above or slightly below the 0.5-threshold. Since both constructs extracted 
more variance than they share with each other (Pearson correlation coefficient r = –0.10; 
r2 = 0.01), discriminant validity was supported. Given these results, the following 
analyses use scale averages. 
3.3.4 Manipulation checks 
As in the pre-test, we verified that our manipulations of the independent variables worked 
as intended. To this end, all participants responded to several manipulation check 
questions after reading a vignette. The item for CSIR severity asked participants to rate 
whether the incident was very severe or not on a seven-point Likert-type scale. The 
respondents’ perception of CSIR severity was significantly lower for vignettes that 
described a CSIR incident with low severity than for vignettes containing a description 
of a CSIR incident of high severity (Mlow = 3.92, Mhigh = 6.58; t(133), p < 0.001). Another 
item asked the participants whether they had received information on the supplier’s CSR 
reputation before the CSIR incident happened. Almost 84% of the participants who had 
received information on CSR correctly responded to this question. If a respondent 
answered this question with yes, another item appeared on the screen, which specifically 
asked for the perceived nature of the CSR reputation on a seven-point scale (1 := “mainly 
symbolic” to 7 := “mainly substantive”). To ensure that all participants had the same 
information on how to distinguish substantive from symbolic CSR activities, we provided 
a brief explanation to delineate that substantive CSR does involve concrete change of 
business practices while symbolic CSR does not. The participants’ responses were 
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significantly different for substantive and symbolic CSR reputations (Msymbolic = 3.97, 
Msubstantive = 4.77; t(65), p = 0.04). 
3.4 Results 
To test our hypotheses, we relied on analysis of variance (ANOVA). Parametric tests 
(e.g., ANOVA) are appropriate and robust for rating-scale data, and they can be used with 
“small sample sizes, with unequal variances, and with non-normal distributions, with no 
fear of ‘coming to the wrong conclusion’” (Norman, 2010, p. 631). We conducted two 
two-way ANOVAs with CSR reputation (none, symbolic, or substantive) and CSIR 
severity (low or high) as between-subjects factors. Table 7 shows the number of 
participants per cell, the cell means, the corresponding standard deviations for both of our 
dependent variables PI and nWOM, and the correlation between our dependent variables. 
Table 8 and Table 9 show the results of the two ANOVAs. 
Table 7: Frequencies, cell means, standard distributions, and correlation for the 
dependent variables 
Experimental condition 
Purchase 
intention (PI) 
Negative word-of-
mouth (nWOM) Number of 
observations 
(n = 135) 
Correlation of PI 
and nWOM 
(roverall = –0.48) 
CSIR 
severity 
CSR 
reputation 
M SD M SD 
Low 
None 4.52 1.97 2.06 0.96 23 –0.28 
Symbolic 6.47 0.62 1.10 0.16 17 –0.50 
Substantive 5.73 0.94 1.33 0.43 22 –0.16 
High 
None 3.21 2.09 2.21 1.25 33 –0.35 
Symbolic 3.33 2.13 2.84 1.90 21 –0.47 
Substantive 3.58 2.14 1.96 1.00 19 –0.27 
Table 8: ANOVA results with purchase intention (PI) as dependent variable 
Source Partial SS df MS F p-value  
CSR reputation 27.49 2 13.74 4.19 0.017 * 
CSI severity 156.29 1 156.29 47.65 0.000 *** 
CSR reputation × CSI severity 18.59 2 9.30 2.83 0.062 † 
Model 194.51 5 38.90 0.62 0.000 *** 
Residual 423.15 129 3.28    
Note. SS refers to “sum of squares”, df to “degrees of freedom”, and MS to “mean square”; n = 135. 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
PI was the dependent variable in the first ANOVA. The results revealed an only 
marginally statistically significant interaction effect between CSR reputation and CSIR 
severity (F = 2.83, p = 0.06). The main effects of CSR reputation (F = 4.19, p = 0.02) 
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and CSIR severity (F = 47.65, p < 0.001) were statistically significantly different from 
zero, but are qualified by the interaction effect; hence, we do not dwell on them. 
Table 9: ANOVA results with intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth (nWOM) 
as dependent variable 
Source Partial SS df MS F p-value  
CSR reputation 5.55 2 2.77 2.18 0.118  
CSI severity 22.98 1 22.98 18.03 0.000 *** 
CSR reputation × CSI severity 14.22 2 7.11 5.58 0.005 ** 
Model 39.89 5 7.98 6.26 0.000 *** 
Residual 164.39 129 1.27    
Note. SS refers to “sum of squares”, df to “degrees of freedom”, and MS to “mean square”; n = 135. 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
Planned contrast analysis revealed that when CSIR severity was low, PI was higher 
for substantive and symbolic CSR reputations than for no CSR reputation (Msubstantive, low 
= 5.73, Msymbolic, low = 6.47, Mnone, low = 4.52; p’s < 0.05), supporting Hypotheses 1a and 
2a. Furthermore, when CSIR severity was high, the effect of PI was not significantly 
different from zero across different CSR reputation types (Msubstantive, high = 3.58, 
Msymbolic, high = 3.33, Mnone, high = 3.21; p’s > 0.05), providing no support for Hypothesis 3a. 
Hypothesis 4a, which proposed that symbolic CSR aggravates negative reactions to 
severe CSIR, was also not supported. 
The second ANOVA used nWOM as the dependent variable. Similarly, the results 
revealed a strong and statistically significant interaction between CSR reputation and 
CSIR severity (F = 5.58, p = 0.005). The main effect of CSIR severity (F = 18.03, p < 
0.001), which was qualified by the mentioned interaction effect, was also statistically 
significantly different from zero. Planned contrasts examined differences between 
specific groups. In line with Hypotheses 1b and 2b, when CSIR severity was low, nWOM 
was significantly lower for substantive and symbolic CSR than for no CSR (Msubstantive, low 
= 1.33, Msymbolic, low = 1.10, Mnone, low = 2.06; p’s < 0.05). When CSIR severity was high, 
nWOM was not significantly different between the substantive and no CSR conditions 
(Msubstantive, high = 1.96, Mnone, high = 2.21; p = 0.45). This is inconsistent with Hypothesis 
3b. Finally, as predicted in Hypothesis 4b, nWOM was significantly higher for symbolic 
CSR than for no CSR (Msymbolic, high = 2.84, Mnone, high = 2.21; p = 0.05). Figures 6a and 6b 
depict the two interaction effects, and Table 10 provides a summary of our tested 
hypotheses. 
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Figure 6: Interaction effect of CSR reputation and CSIR severity 
(a) Purchase intention (PI) as dependent 
variable 
(b) Intention to engage in negative word-
of-mouth (nWOM) as dependent 
variable 
  
Table 10: Summary of hypotheses and results 
Hypothesis Prediction Result 
H1 
If a firm with a reputation for substantive CSR is involved in non-severe 
CSIR, it experiences smaller negative effects on its customers’ 
 
(a) purchase intention Supported 
(b) intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth Supported 
than firms that do not have a reputation for CSR.  
H2 
If a firm with a reputation for symbolic CSR is involved in non-severe CSIR, 
it experiences smaller negative effects on its customers’  
 
(a) purchase intention Supported 
(b) intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth Supported 
than firms that do not have a reputation for CSR.  
H3 
If a firm with a reputation for substantive CSR is involved in severe CSIR, 
it experiences smaller negative effects on its customers’ 
 
(a) purchase intention Not supported 
(b) intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth Not supported 
than firms that do not have a reputation for CSR.  
H4 
If a firm with a reputation for symbolic CSR is involved in severe CSIR, 
it experiences larger negative effects on its customers’ 
 
(a) purchase intention Not supported 
(b) intention to engage in negative word-of-mouth Supported 
than firms that do not have a reputation for CSR.  
To examine the robustness of our findings and to ensure that the participants’ 
intentions were not determined by their level of CSR support and experience, we included 
both variables as covariates in separate analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) with PI and 
nWOM as dependent variables and CSR reputation as well as CSIR severity as 
independent variables. Neither the level of CSR support nor the work experience in 
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supply chain management of the participants had a statistically significant influence on 
the dependent variables. Hence, the predicted effects remained qualitatively similar. 
3.5 Discussion 
In the academic literature, the topic of CSIR has rarely been addressed, although 
“avoiding bad” constitutes a precondition for firms to be perceived as socially 
responsible. The recurrent examples of firms that are involved in CSIR prove that it is a 
challenging task to prevent environmental and social misconduct. Subsequent negative 
stakeholder reactions may severely damage a firm’s performance and reputation; thus, 
responsible managers need to address them. Many firms believe that their ex ante CSR 
engagement may provide insurance-like effects, which attenuate negative effects of 
CSIR. Several research efforts have supported this idea. However, we demonstrated that 
a firm’s reputation for CSR plays a more complex role in managing stakeholder reactions 
to CSIR. Thereby, we contribute to the literature on CSR, CSIR, and disruption 
management by (1) providing insights into the moderating effects of ex ante CSR 
reputations in case of CSIR, (2) demonstrating that the insurance-like or aggravating 
effects of prior CSR reputations are determined by the reputation’s nature (substantive/ 
symbolic) and the severity of CSIR, and (3) improving our understanding of managing 
CSR and CSIR in buyer-supplier relationships. 
3.5.1 Theoretical implications 
This study analyzed the role of a firm’s CSR reputation in moderating negative 
stakeholder reactions to CSIR. Our analysis, based on the data from a vignette-based 
experiment with supply chain professionals, yielded several important theoretical 
implications. We addressed a number of recent calls for more research on the topic of 
CSIR (e.g., Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018; Lin-Hi & Müller, 2013), CSR-related crisis 
management (e.g., Janssen et al., 2015; Lenz et al., 2017; Shiu & Yang, 2017), the 
implications of utilizing substantive and symbolic CSR actions (Hawn & Ioannou, 2012, 
2016), and industrial buying contexts (Homburg, Stierl, & Bornemann, 2013) to fill an 
important and relevant gap in the current academic discussion on the value of ex ante 
CSR reputations at times of crises. 
First, we contribute to the body of literature that explicitly distinguishes between 
CSR and CSIR as two different constructs. This distinction is central to our research 
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design, as CSR comprises voluntary activities of a firm to “do good” while CSIR reflects 
a firm’s inability to “avoid bad.” Our findings address the relationship between CSR and 
CSIR and provide insights into their effect on the intentions of stakeholders. More 
specifically, as suggested by prior research (e.g., Lin-Hi & Blumberg, 2018; Lin-Hi & 
Müller, 2013), our results highlight that preventing (severe) CSIR is a precondition for 
firms to effectively utilize their CSR reputation. 
Second, and in line with previous research, our study highlights that it is important 
to distinguish between different facets of CSR (Hawn & Ioannou, 2012, 2016). Moreover, 
this study’s results provide empirical evidence that the distinction between substantive 
and symbolic CSR is relevant not only in business-to-consumer (B2C) but also in B2B 
contexts. The circumstance that our result do not provide support for Hypotheses 3a and 
3b might have been driven by compliance concerns and issues from the participants’ own 
work environments. Such concerns might have affected the results in a way that the more 
favorable attribution of substantive CSR were not sufficient to mitigate the perceived 
negativity of the presented CSIR incident. This would highlight an important difference 
between consumers and professional buyers. 
Third, beyond adding further empirical support to the observation that insurance-
like or risk-mitigating effects of CSR do not always hold (e.g., Sen & Bhattacharya, 
2001), we contribute to specifying the boundary conditions of these effects and 
demonstrate that whether a firm benefits from “doing good” or not (when it is involved 
in CSIR) depends on the nature of a firm’s CSR reputation (substantive/ symbolic) and 
CSIR severity. The results suggest that both substantive and symbolic CSR reputations 
mitigate negative stakeholder reactions to corporate environmental and social misconduct 
if the severity of a specific CSIR incident is low. When firms are involved in severe CSIR 
the effect of ex ante CSR can switch from insulation to amplification. Prior research has 
found that severe CSIR incidents can recalibrate stakeholders’ expectations (Huq, 
Chowdhury, & Klassen, 2016). Our results add to this insight by demonstrating that in 
case of severe CSIR, the effect of a firm’s CSR reputation on negative stakeholder 
reactions depends on its nature and the specific dimension of the stakeholder reaction. 
While firms with substantive CSR reputations seem not to benefit from their ex ante 
activities regarding negative stakeholder reactions to severe CSIR, stakeholders of firms 
with reputations driven mainly by symbolic CSR actions even express higher intentions 
to engage in nWOM compared to stakeholders of firms that have no reputation for CSR.  
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For PI, we were not able to find sufficient statistical evidence to show that the 
reactions of stakeholders to severe CSIR depend on the CSR reputation. This must not be 
interpreted as evidence that there is no effect. Methodological reasons might have 
influenced this result. For example, in case of symbolic CSR, contrast effects resulting in 
a change of both PI and nWOM might require higher levels of CSIR severity. Similarly, 
the chosen description of high severity might already represent a level too high for 
substantive CSR to result in assimilation effects. The incident described in our 
experimental material might have been too severe to be attenuated by favorable 
attributions of a firm’s CSR motives. However, a possible explanation for the lack of 
evidence to support Hypothesis 4a is that for an individual’s PI, it might not be relevant 
whether substantive or symbolic CSR engagement has formed stakeholder expectations. 
In case of severe CSIR, the disparity between a customer’s expectations and a firm’s true 
performance might be perceived as similar for both substantive and symbolic actions 
since they can also be equally successful in gaining legitimacy and fostering expectations. 
Customers might be more willing to share the disconfirmation of their expectations if 
firms used symbolic actions instead of no CSR engagement to affect their expectations 
based on the perceived motives of a firm’s CSR engagement. Once ex ante CSR efforts 
are identified as greenwashing, they cast doubt on a customer’s prior expectations. To 
prevent others within their peer group from building high expectations based on symbolic 
CSR engagement, customers seem to be more willing to engage in nWOM than if the 
expectations were based on substantive CSR or no CSR engagement at all. 
Finally, our findings enhance our understanding of the impact of CSR on industrial 
buying situations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly 
addresses the role played by ex ante CSR reputations on CSIR-related disruption 
management in a B2B environment. Previous research has highlighted that many decision 
makers might not be aware of the benefits associated with CSR-related activities along 
their firms’ supply chains (Paulraj, Chen, & Blome, 2017), but we provide empirical 
support for implementing CSR based on instrumental rather than moral motives. 
Moreover, prior studies have focused on the B2C perspective and important consumer 
outcomes, such as satisfaction and loyalty. Although these findings may partially hold 
true in B2B contexts, it is well-researched that professional buyers differ considerably 
from consumers. Thus, we focused on customer outcomes, considered characteristics of 
industrial buying, and addressed a highly relevant topic because our research is among 
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the first studies to empirically analyze positive effects of CSR actions in industrial buying 
contexts (Homburg et al., 2013). As firms are increasingly held responsible for 
misconduct within their supply chain, the implications of our study extend previous work 
by emphasizing that not only firms which are positioned downstream the supply chain 
can considerably benefit from CSR but also those which are further upstream and less 
visible to consumers (C. G. Schmidt, Foerstl, & Schaltenbrand, 2017). 
3.5.2 Managerial implications 
Several implications for managerial practice can be deduced from the results. Given the 
study’s focus on industrial buying contexts, a key insight is that CSR engagement is 
worthwhile not only in B2C but also in B2B contexts. Both substantive and symbolic 
CSR reputations can have insurance-like effects in case of non-severe CSIR in industrial 
buying situations. This provides a strong justification for managers to pursue an 
intensified engagement in CSR to benefit from mitigated negative stakeholder reactions 
in case of misconduct. In addition, the study’s findings underline the necessity of 
managers to proactively reflect on different stakeholders and their expectations, as 
delineated in previous work (Gualandris, Klassen, Vachon, & Kalchschmidt, 2015). 
However, our results suggest that engaging in CSR without considering the nature of the 
specific actions can backfire in times of crises. Customers can distinguish between 
substantive and symbolic actions, which has important repercussions on their behavior. 
CSR reputations based on symbolic actions cannot fully avoid more intense negative 
stakeholder reactions when a firm is involved in severe CSIR. Thus, managers should be 
aware of the nature of their firm’s own CSR engagement. Prior research highlights that 
the decision to pursue substantive or symbolic CSR activities depends on cost-benefit 
considerations (e.g., Christmann & Taylor, 2006; Durand et al., 2017; Kaul & Luo, 2018). 
However, based on our results, if the expected probability of severe environmental or 
social misconduct is considerably high, managers should be careful about addressing 
stakeholder demands with potentially backfiring symbolic CSR actions. In this case, 
managers might rather decide to invest in substantive CSR activities instead. Compared 
to merely symbolic CSR claims that do not entail specific changes in business processes, 
substantive CSR has the potential to mitigate environmental and social risk while offering 
insurance-like effects if a firm is involved in non-severe CSIR. 
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In addition, our findings suggest that managers who decide to engage merely in 
“doing good” to develop a firm’s reputation for CSR might not always benefit from a 
competitive advantage over firms that provide similar products but do not have a 
reputation for CSR. When (potential) customers are confronted with a supplier’s 
involvement in severe CSIR, firms with CSR reputations driven by substantive CSR 
actions seem to perform just as good as firms that do not have a reputation for CSR. Firms 
that engage mainly in symbolic actions might even have a disadvantage and suffer more 
than do firms that do not promote themselves as socially responsible. This underlines the 
need for managers to also consider “avoiding bad” as a precondition to benefit from 
voluntary CSR engagement. Hence, more attention, effort, and resources should be 
invested in mitigating the risk that CSIR occurs within their firms’ supply network to 
effectively utilize a firm’s reputation for CSR, since engaging in CSR does not 
automatically provide protection against negative stakeholder reactions. 
3.5.3 Limitations and future research opportunities 
This study and its findings are subject to certain limitations, which provide fruitful 
avenues for future research. The participants examined scenarios containing information 
about a specific one-shot buying situation describing a potential supplier’s CSR 
reputation and involvement in CSIR. In real industrial buying processes, the participants 
are likely to receive such information in a more fragmented fashion, perhaps over multiple 
time periods. Moreover, we focused on individuals with centralized decision making 
authority and one single supplier option to choose from, which might often deviate from 
organizational practice. Thus, further research should account for the dynamics of 
organizational buying processes and buying decisions of teams while considering 
multiple supplier options would add to further support the validity and generalizability of 
our findings. In addition, field experiments investigating the effect of CSR reputations on 
stakeholder reactions to CSIR would also contribute an increased generalizability of our 
findings, although we carefully designed our experiment to provide externally valid 
results. This is especially important, because the use of vignettes enabled us to analyze 
only the participants’ intentions rather than their actual behaviors. Still, ample empirical 
evidence suggests that intentions may serve as reliable indicators of actual behavior (e.g., 
Ajzen, 1991; T. L. Webb & Sheeran, 2006). 
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In the manipulations of CSR reputations, we have focused on describing firms with 
and without a reputation for CSR. This means that we kept the “strength” of a reputation 
for CSR constant. Future research might investigate whether the effects described in our 
study can be replicated with reputations of different strength. To generate insurance-like 
effects, reputations for CSR might have to exceed a certain threshold of power. Prior 
research, for instance, has highlighted that short histories of CSR engagement are not 
sufficient to mitigate negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR (Vanhamme & Grobben, 
2009).  
This study took a single episode perspective, although firms might be involved in 
several recurring incidents of environmental and social misconduct over time. A 
promising direction for future research is to investigate whether and how a reputation for 
CSR immunizes against CSIR in multi-period settings. For example, initial insurance-
like effects of reputations for CSR could end up having an aggravation effect in case of 
recurring involvement in CSIR. Customers might tolerate minor isolated performance 
deviations from their expectations, but once a firm is involved in several cascading CSIR 
incidents, its CSR reputation might not provide protection anymore and could, on the 
contrary, lead to aggravated negative reactions. Just recently, Shiu and Yang (2017) 
reported diminishing insurance-like effects of CSR. However, as they did not distinguish 
between substantive and symbolic CSR engagement and focused on investors, some open 
questions regarding the evanescence of the insurance-like mechanism of ex ante CSR 
remain. 
Moreover, the effects of substantive and symbolic CSR on negative stakeholder 
reactions might be closely related to trust. Trust might affect an individual’s effort used 
to distinguish substantive from merely symbolic CSR while a customer’s perception of a 
firm’s CSR might influence the effect of service failure on customer trust (Bozic, 2017; 
Choi & La, 2013). Hence, exploring how trust affects the moderating role of CSR 
regarding the link between CSIR and negative stakeholder reactions is a promising 
avenue for future research. 
Another interesting avenue for future research could be to investigate whether 
professional buyers differ considerably from consumers regarding how they react to firms 
with a reputation for CSR that are involved into CSIR. On the one hand, consumers might 
react even more negatively to severe misconduct, regardless of the nature of a firm’s CSR 
reputation, especially if switching costs are low. On the other hand, whether a large 
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disparity between expectations and a firm’s true performance will be tolerated might 
depend on the loyalty of a consumer. In addition, the behavior of professional buyers is 
subject to corporate governance rules and standard operating procedures that determine 
compliant behavior. These constraints might limit the response options or even dictate a 
specific behavior. This aspect has not been considered in our experimental design. 
Another limitation of this study is the relatively moderate sample size. Of special 
interest for future research could be the potential boomerang effects regarding Hypothesis 
4b. This study indicates that symbolic CSR engagement can potentially backfire 
following CSIR but it does not analyze the underlying cause of this effect in more detail. 
More specifically, subsequent studies might investigate why symbolic CSR merely led to 
more negative stakeholder reactions concerning nWOM but not PI. In addition and 
closely related to the aforementioned issue, for PI as dependent variable, conclusions 
based on our results need to be drawn with caution due to the limited evidence provided 
by the only marginally significant interaction effect of CSR reputation and CSIR severity. 
Hence, to achieve a higher generalizability regarding the generated insights, we 
encourage the validation of our results using a larger sample. 
Finally, choice behavior might also vary with the cultural background of 
respondents. We chose to limit the empirical study to Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, 
because from a cultural perspective, these three countries are usually considered to be 
very similar and homogeneous (Hofstede, 1984, 2003). A relevant next step would be to 
scrutinize the robustness of the effects across different cultural regions. People from 
North America, for example, differ from the population sampled in this study in that they 
display lower uncertainty avoidance and higher degree of individualism. It could be 
conjectured that North American supply chain professionals are less affected by the 
uncertainty created by the discrepancy between a firm’s CSR reputation a case of 
misconduct (lower uncertainty avoidance), although at the same time, they could be less 
willing to engage in negative word-of-mouth (higher degree of individualism).  
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Chapter 4 Supply disruption management: The 
early bird catches the worm, but the 
second mouse gets the cheese? 
Co-author: 
Christoph Bode 
Endowed Chair of Procurement, Business School, University of Mannheim, Germany 
Abstract6 
In the direct aftermath of supply disruptions, managers typically face uncertainty in the 
form of incomplete or unreliable information about the consequences of possible response 
actions. To gain a better understanding of how to recover from disruptions and support 
effective disruption management, this study pursues a multi-method research approach. 
First, we propose an agent-based simulation model of supply disruption responses and 
recovery processes to reveal how managers should behave. Based on this model, we 
analyze the performance outcomes of a decision maker’s tendency to reduce uncertainty 
by collecting further information before taking action (ready-aim-fire) or to act 
immediately (ready-fire-aim) under different conditions. Second, vignette-based 
experiments with supply chain professionals are conducted to show how managers 
actually intend to behave in supply disruption recovery. The findings suggest that 
managers' intentions deviate from how they should behave and that quick reactions to 
disruptions can be beneficial, even if the exact consequences of a response action cannot 
precisely be determined. Furthermore, in complex environments, ready-fire-aim leads to 
a better average performance than ready-aim-fire, if response uncertainty is not very high. 
The derived insights provide novel theoretical and managerial implications for effective 
disruption management.  
                                                          
6 Merath, M. and Bode, C., 2018. Supply disruption management: The early bird catches the worm, but the 
second mouse gets the cheese? Unpublished Working Paper, 1-45. An earlier version won the “Chan Hahn 
Best Paper Award” of the Operations and Supply Chain Management Division of the Academy of 
Management at the Annual Meeting in Atlanta, GA, in 2017. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Supply chain disruptions are defined as “unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt 
the normal flow of goods and materials within a supply chain […] and, as a consequence, 
expose firms within the supply chain to operational and financial risks” (Craighead et al., 
2007, p. 132). In the last decades, firms’ risk of being harmed by disruptions seems to 
have increased (Sodhi, Son, & Tang, 2012). On the one hand, modern supply chains have 
evolved into more complex and vulnerable interconnected networks (Bode & Wagner, 
2015). On the other hand, natural disasters are becoming more frequent (Munich Re, 
2015). 
Many types of supply chain disruptions – especially those characterized by high 
impact and low probability – cannot be completely avoided. The decisions that managers 
take in response to severe disruptions inevitably affect the success of a firm’s recovery, 
as demonstrated by the often-cited Albuquerque fire (Latour, 2001). On March 17, 2000, 
a Philips plant in Albuquerque, New Mexico, was hit by lightning and caught fire. 
Initially, it seemed that the damage would be limited. Philips informed the two main 
customers of the chips produced in this plant, Nokia and Ericsson, about an expected 
delivery delay of one week. Yet, the responses of the two competitors were completely 
different. Nokia reacted directly, put pressure on Philips, and collaborated with 
alternative suppliers to rebound from the disruption with minimal negative consequences. 
Ericsson adopted a “wait and see” approach and delayed remedial action until more 
information became available. When it was clear that the damage to the clean rooms was 
far more substantial than expected, Ericsson was not able to find an alternative supplier 
on short notice and had to delay the launch of a new product while losing market share to 
Nokia (Latour, 2001; Sheffi, 2005).  
The possible losses that supply chain disruptions may entail are well-researched 
(Hendricks & Singhal, 2005a,b), but the process of reactive supply disruption 
management has received only limited research attention. In particular, our understanding 
of how firms should respond to supply chain disruptions in order to quickly recover is 
weak (Bode et al., 2011; Macdonald & Corsi, 2013). This issue is important, because a 
firm’s ability to effectively respond to sudden disruptions is critical to both its short-term 
performance and long-term competitiveness. 
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Responding to disruptions usually requires decision making in complex 
environments characterized by uncertainty and limited information. Under these 
conditions, some firms defer actions until (most of) the uncertainty has been resolved and 
reliable information is available, while other firms respond immediately, even though the 
information at hand is cloudy (Kleinmuntz & Thomas, 1987). Using the analogy of 
shooting, the first approach can be termed ready-aim-fire (RAF) and the second ready-
fire-aim (RFA). Intuitively, RAF may lead to more precise actions than RFA, but loss is 
typically a function of time and RAF may also allow quicker competitors to obtain 
superior positions. Conversely, RFA carries the inefficiencies of trial and error and, when 
decisions are irreversible and path-dependent, the risk of pursuing an inferior recovery 
path. Hence, the key question is: Under which circumstances should a manager delay its 
response actions until more evidence is acquired and how do managers actually intend to 
behave? 
This study addresses this issue by means of a multi-method research approach. 
First, we develop an agent-based model to perform simulation experiments and delineate 
how managers should theoretically behave in disruption response situations. Second, we 
conduct vignette-based experiments with supply chain managers to adopt a more 
behavioral perspective and demonstrate how managers actually intend to approach 
disruption recovery as opposed to how they should behave. The results provide insights 
into effective decision making in the aftermath of supply chain disruptions and contribute 
to the knowledge of supply chain disruptions management. 
4.2 Supply disruption management and resilience 
The complexity and interconnectedness of modern supply chains create vulnerabilities 
that expose firms to the risk of being affected by severe disruptions of the flows of 
materials, information, and funds (Sheffi, 2005). A supply chain disruption is a 
combination of an unforeseen event that interrupts these flows and a subsequent situation 
that distorts the normal course of a focal firm’s business operations. We focus on 
disruptive events that cannot be resolved in the course of daily operations management 
and that occur in a focal firm’s upstream supply chain (in the following: Supply 
disruptions). It has been suggested that supply chain disruptions “are more critical when 
they occur upstream in the chain” (Pereira et al., 2014, p. 627). 
Supply disruption management: The early bird catches the worm, but the second mouse gets the cheese? 64 
 
There is a large body of literature on these disruptions and the management of 
supply chain risks (e.g., Heckmann et al., 2015; Rao & Goldsby, 2009). In these works, 
there is an agreement that supply disruptions have a certain time profile regarding their 
adverse effects on firm performance (Sheffi, 2005). As shown in Figure 7, a disruption 
leads to a sudden drop in operating performance which then triggers search and recovery 
efforts (Bode et al., 2011). 
Figure 7: Typical supply disruption profile 
 
Although supply disruptions may have serious negative consequences for firm 
performance, many firms prove themselves unprepared (Handfield, Blackhurst, Elkins, 
& Craighead, 2007). The ability to recover from disruptive events is a major component 
of a firm’s resilience, a concept which has been widely used in numerous disciplines. 
Resilience is the “ability of a system to return to its original state or move to a new, more 
desirable state after being disturbed” (Christopher & Peck, 2004, p. 2). In the supply chain 
context, Sheffi (2005) defined resilience as the ability and the speed at which firms fully 
recover (i.e., return to normal performance levels) from high-impact/ low-probability 
disruptions. He added that when “thinking about resilience, it may not be productive to 
think about the underlying reason for the disruption – the kind of random, accidental, or 
malicious act that may cause a disruption. Instead, the focus should be on the damage to 
the network and how the network can rebound quickly” (p. 14). For this reason, this 
investigation does not focus on the causes of supply disruptions but solely on their impact 
on operating performance. 
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4.3 How managers should behave in supply disruption 
response situations 
4.3.1 A model of supply disruption recovery 
To recover from a disruption, managers need to actively adjust their firms’ operations 
(Blackhurst, Craighead, Elkins, & Handfield, 2005; Chakravarthy, 1982), which can be 
interpreted as an adaptation process. Our model of this process is based on the NK model 
(Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997) and is similar to recent organizational research using 
agent-based modeling (e.g., Chandrasekaran, Linderman, Sting, & Benner, 2016; 
Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). Many models of organizational behavior focus on closed-
form solutions that maintain analytical tractability by substantially simplifying the 
representations of organizations their environments. Agent-based modeling allows us to 
consider more complex settings than closed-form approaches and to generate meaningful 
hypotheses as a basis for empirical studies (Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005). Following 
Burton and Obel (1984, 1995, 2004), we build a model that is just as complex as 
necessary. It “should not be seen as a literal representation of environments and 
organizations, but as the simplest representation that can fulfill our intended purpose” 
(Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005, p. 103). 
Fundamental to our study is to view firms as information-processing systems 
(Galbraith, 1977; Thompson, 1967; Tushman & Nadler, 1978). According to 
information-processing theory (IPT), responses of organizations to environmental 
changes are driven by sequential information-processing activities (Barr, 1998; Dutton, 
Fahey, & Narayanan, 1983). IPT has been widely used to study organizational decision 
making processes subsequent to exogenous changes (e.g., Bode et al., 2011). Most 
notably, Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and Theoret (1976) identified general steps of strategic 
decision making that form an iterative incremental process: Identification, development, 
and selection. Hale, Hale, and Dulek (2006) transferred this process model to crisis 
responses and found that recognition (problem discovery and identification of a need to 
take a decision), search (for information and alternative actions), and evaluation/ choice 
of response options are common crisis recovery stages. Since crisis response processes 
are comparable to disruption response processes, we consider these stages part of a firm’s 
disruption response process. 
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4.3.2 The environment 
We assume that each decision maker faces a choice problem consisting of N different 
binary decisions. These decisions represent the configuration of the firm’s activities and 
determine the overall performance given the environment. Examples of such decisions 
include the selection of a supplier, the logistics and delivery concept, or whether a specific 
material can be substituted or not. A specific instance of a firm’s choices is called choice 
configuration and denoted by the decision vector d = (d1, …, di, …, dN) ∊ {0, 1}N. The 
choice configurations are evaluated by a fitness value function F = F(d) which expresses 
the firm performance the decision makers seek to maximize. 
The contribution of each decision i to the fitness value depends not only on its own 
state di (0 or 1) but also on the complexity of the environment. A large number of 
decisions (N) does not make a problem complex per se, because complexity emerges from 
elements of a system “that interact in a nonsimple way” (Simon, 1962, p. 468). We regard 
these interdependencies as characteristics of a firm’s environment, because they “are 
dictated by the nature of the decisions themselves and […] are not chosen by the firm” 
(Siggelkow & Rivkin, 2005, p. 103). The complexity of an environment is expressed by 
the intensity of interactions among the N decisions specified by the parameter K ∊ {0, 1, 
…, N – 1}. K determines the number of decisions upon which the contribution of each 
decision i depends. We denote the state of these K decisions by the vector d–i = (di1, …, 
diK) ∊ {0, 1}K. The fitness contribution of each decision i is evaluated by a contribution 
function Ci = Ci(di, d–i). If K equals 0, Ci depends solely on the state of di. If K equals N 
– 1, Ci depends on di and the states of all other decisions. 
After N and K have been specified, a pattern of interaction among the decisions is 
created. K decisions are randomly assigned to each decision i. For each of the possible 
2K+1 realizations of di and d–i, a contribution Ci is generated by drawing a random number 
from a standard uniform distribution (i.e., Ci ~ U(0, 1)). This is repeated for all N 
decisions. The fitness value of a choice configuration d is then defined as the average of 
the contributions of each decision: 
 𝐹(𝐝) =
∑ 𝐶𝑖(𝑑𝑖; 𝐝−𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
 . (7) 
All 2N possible choice configurations and their respective fitness values form a 
firm’s environment (e.g., Chandrasekaran et al., 2016; Levinthal, 1997). Interactions 
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among decisions cause environments to become “rugged” and multipeaked instead of 
smooth and equipped with single optima. If K equals 0, a change of a single decision 
leaves the contributions of all other decisions unaffected and the fitness value can always 
be improved by changing each decision to the state with the highest contribution. If K is 
larger than 0, environments become “rugged” in a sense that changing the state of one 
decision from 0 to 1 or vice versa also affects the fitness contributions of K other 
decisions, leading to multiple local optima. The number of the latter tends to increase 
with K, making the search process for a high peak increasingly difficult. 
4.3.3 Organizational adaptation to environmental change 
Firms adapt to their environment by means of sequential dynamic search processes and 
corresponding information processing (e.g., Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Katila & Ahuja, 
2002; Levinthal, 1997; March & Simon, 1958). Due to the bounded rationality of decision 
makers and firms, the alternatives of how to adapt to environmental changes are not 
entirely and instantly known and must first be searched or discovered (Simon, 1955). 
These search processes are guided by “satisficing” rather than by optimizing (Simon, 
1979). 
The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that organizational search is problem-
oriented and triggered by performance shortfalls (Cyert & March, 1963). Furthermore, 
firms tend to search locally for alternative actions (March & Simon, 1958; Winter, 
Cattani, & Dorsch, 2007). They modify their configuration by identifying and 
implementing superior configurations which are part of the immediate “neighborhood of 
the organization’s current practices” (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007, p. 43). In line with 
previous research on NK models, we follow the central assumption of local search (e.g., 
Gavetti, Levinthal, & Rivkin, 2005; Winter et al., 2007). During our simulation 
experiments, firms examine alternative choice configurations which differ from their 
current choice configurations in the state of one of the N decisions, selected at random. If 
it provides a greater fitness value than the current choice configuration, the state of the 
respective decision is changed (i.e., from 0 to 1 or vice versa). Otherwise, the choice 
configuration remains unchanged. This procedure is repeated in every period and often 
termed local “hill climbing” (Levinthal, 1997). 
An environmental change can have various causes and take many forms. When it 
comes to events such as supply disruptions, firms tend to centralize and assign decision 
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making responsibility to a single manager (“troubleshooter”) or team (Dubrovski, 2004). 
Accordingly, agents in our simulation model can be seen as individual decision makers 
or teams that have been tasked with the recovery decisions. Their behavior is predefined 
by a set of rules. 
4.3.4 Supply disruptions and uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a central concept for research concerned with the relationship between 
organizations and their environments (e.g., Dill, 1958; Duncan, 1972; Thompson, 1967). 
In congruence with the information-processing perspective, we build on the notion that 
uncertainty and information are closely interrelated. Uncertainty is defined “as a 
manifestation of some information deﬁciency, while information is viewed as the 
capacity to reduce uncertainty” (Klir, 2005, p. xiii). For decision makers, uncertainty is 
the “difference between the amount of information required to perform a task and the 
amount of information already possessed” (Galbraith, 1973, p. 5). Gathering information 
to reduce uncertainty is a critical activity for decision making (Cooper, Folta, & Woo, 
1995). 
Three types of environmental uncertainty can be distinguished: State, effect, and 
response uncertainty. State uncertainty involves the inability to understand or predict the 
state of the environment, while effect uncertainty impairs an individual’s ability to predict 
the impact of environmental changes on organizations (Milliken, 1987). For actions, 
response uncertainty is the most prevailing issue (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). It is 
defined as a “lack of knowledge of response options and/or an inability to predict the 
likely consequences of a response choice” (Milliken, 1987, p. 137) and is salient in almost 
every supply disruption recovery process. It is experienced when there is a perceived need 
to act or formulate “a response to an immediate threat in the environment” (Milliken, 
1987, p. 138). Especially in the early stages of a disruption response, information on 
causes and effects tends to be incomplete or inaccurate (M. Chen, Xia, & Wang, 2010). 
From a behavioral perspective, uncertainty is associated with “a sense of doubt that 
blocks or delays action” (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997, p. 150). The potential costs of an 
incorrect response may deter a decision maker from taking action (Milliken, 1987). 
However, delaying a decision is also costly and may allow competitors to respond faster 
to disruptions. Research on disruption management has provided anecdotal evidence that 
the disruption recovery performance is time-dependent (Macdonald & Corsi, 2013). Yet, 
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we still lack convincing evidence on the link between response speed and recovery 
performance. 
In previous research on organizational search behavior, the problem of evaluating 
response alternatives has been treated as being trivial (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007). To 
address this criticism, we investigate the impact of response uncertainty on the evaluation 
of response alternatives. During every simulation run, the environment is replaced by a 
new randomly generated environment to represent the effect of a supply disruption. 
However, the latter is accompanied by response uncertainty and fitness values of 
alternative configurations are distorted by a uniformly distributed random error. The 
firms differ in the way they react to this response uncertainty as described in the next 
sections. 
4.3.5 Disruption response strategies 
Search processes of firms are affected by preferences and characteristics of individuals. 
Decision makers may differ in the degree of risk avoidance (e.g., depending on cultural 
differences (Hofstede, 1993)) or the preferred amount of information collected to solve a 
problem (O'Reilly, 1982). Accordingly, some organizations penetrate their environment 
more than others. Daft and Weick (1984) noted that “organizations may leap before they 
look” (p. 288). Against this backdrop, we distinguish two disruption response strategies 
under response uncertainty: Ready-aim-fire and ready-fire-aim. These strategies7 have 
been mentioned in the fields of management, strategy, and decision theory (e.g., Cox, 
2000; Peters & Waterman, 1982), but, to the best of our knowledge, have not been clearly 
delineated. 
Ready-aim-fire (RAF). In the face of uncertainty, some firms may prefer to delay 
a decision until more information becomes available (Kleinmuntz & Thomas, 1987). A 
firm can receive additional information passively (e.g., via media announcements) or 
actively (e.g., through its own investigations) (Milliken, 1987). Action is delayed in the 
hopes that less uncertainty makes the choice of an appropriate alternative easier and more 
accurate. Borrowing an analogy from marksmanship, we call this strategy ready-aim-fire. 
Its main idea is to reduce response uncertainty and purse accurate analysis before action 
is taken (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997; Mintzberg & Westley, 2001; Peters & Waterman, 
                                                          
7 Similar terms that can be found in the literature are “look before you leap” vs. “leap before you look”, 
“judgment-oriented” vs. “action-oriented”, or “wait and see”/ ”watchful waiting” vs. action. 
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1982) and it can be seen as the rational or “proper” sequence to problem solving. In 
general, the rational decision making approach consists of the stages problem definition, 
diagnosis, design of alternatives, and selection of the preferred option (Mintzberg & 
Westley, 2001). These steps are conducted sequentially, with diagnosis as an action-
enabling step. As organizational decision making processes tend to be incremental, they 
involve iterative cycles of design and readjustment (Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
Ready-fire-aim (RFA). In practice, firms often do not follow the rational RAF 
strategy. Empirical insights reveal that managers are inclined to prefer quick action to 
analysis (Isenberg, 1984; Mintzberg et al., 1976). The studies of Mintzberg (1973) about 
what managers actually do, as opposed to what they are supposed to do or what they say 
they do, indicate that rational problem solving was rarely employed. Instead, an action-
orientation has frequently been observed (Isenberg, 1986; Mintzberg & Westley, 2001). 
Taking action provides orientation and information that enables to learn and adjust 
response efforts (Rudolph, Morrison, & Carroll, 2009). We call this strategy ready-fire-
aim. It has been recognized in innovative firms, which tend to act rather than analyze, 
plan, and postpone action (Peters & Waterman, 1982). Weick (1979) argued that 
“postponing action while planning continues could prove dangerous [...] and any chance 
of clarifying the situation will decrease, simply because there is nothing available to be 
clarified or made meaningful” (p. 103). In case of dramatic change, he suggested that 
“chaotic action is preferable to orderly inaction” (p. 245). Daft and Weick (1984) added 
that “feedback from organizational actions may provide new collective insights” (p. 286) 
which may improve both the understanding of a situation as well as the ability to 
implement an effective response. Accordingly, RFA is based on Weick’s (1979) idea of 
organizations engaging in iterative cycles of action and reaction to gradually reduce 
uncertainty related to environmental information. 
In our model, a firm that applies RAF uses the first period after a supply disruption 
to collect information and resolve the response uncertainty while its choice configuration 
remains unchanged. Afterwards, the firm engages in local search and is able to perfectly 
predict the fitness values of alternative configurations. In contrast, a firm that applies 
RFA immediately starts local search after a supply disruption and faces noisy information 
due to response uncertainty. In line with G. Wu (1999) – who suggested that “uncertainty 
about the outcome of a particular state of nature is often not resolved immediately after 
an act is selected” (p. 159) – we assume that response uncertainty is dynamic and does 
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not completely vanish after action has been taken. Hence, the fitness values of both a 
firm’s current configuration and alternative configurations are distorted by uniformly 
distributed random errors for D periods. The random errors are newly generated in each 
period and are part of an interval of a pre-defined value E of standard deviations (SD) of 
all fitness values of a given environment and range from –E × SD to E × SD. The size of 
this interval decreases linearly over time. If the duration of response uncertainty D equals 
5, the interval will shrink by 20 percent of its initial size in each period and the response 
uncertainty is resolved after 5 periods. 
Figure 8 depicts an individual simulation run over 80 periods of time. For every 
period of time (x-axis), the corresponding fitness value for each firm (agent) is plotted on 
the y-axis. The firm pursuing RFA immediately responds to the disruption in period 40 
although fitness values of choice configurations are distorted (FRFA, perceived, dotted black 
line). However, the true fitness value (FRFA, true, solid black line) is reduced by some 
alterations. The firm pursuing RAF acts later, but does not experience detrimental 
decisions during its recovery (FRAF, solid gray line). Finally, both firms recover from the 
disruption’s negative consequences reaching different long-term fitness values. 
Figure 8: An individual simulation run 
 
Note. The simulation run was conducted in a setting with N = 6, Khigh, Emedium, Dlong, and PDnone. 
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4.3.6 Path dependence 
An important characteristic of actual organizational adaptation processes is path 
dependence (Beinhocker, 1999). Path dependence means that “where we go next depends 
not only on where we are now, but also upon where we have been” (Liebowitz & 
Margolis, 2000, p. 981). Adaptation decisions may influence the available range of future 
options and future flexibility (Nelson, Adger, & Brown, 2007). Serious problems may 
occur if actions that cannot be reversed in the short term prove to be a “shadow of the 
past” which results in inferior outcomes creating lock-in situation (J.-P. Vergne & 
Durand, 2011). Hence, in the face of environmental change, path dependence can force 
firms on a suboptimal course of action (Noda & Collis, 2001). Recent research has 
emphasized the need for a better understanding of path dependence (e.g., Sydow, 
Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009; J. P. Vergne & Durand, 2010). 
Recovery from supply disruptions may involve supply chain reconfigurations that 
are partly or completely irreversible. Moreover, organizational inertia can prevent firms 
from making possible changes. Imagine that one choice of a firm’s decision set concerns 
a supplier selection decision. It is unrealistic to assume that the decision for a specific 
supplier can immediately be reversed in the following period without excessive switching 
costs and time. Against this backdrop, we adopt the view of path-dependent 
organizational action in the context of adaptation to environmental change. To this end, 
we include the parameter PD in our model. PD determines the number of a firm’s first 
alterations that are irreversible. If PD equals 0, all decisions can be reversed in subsequent 
periods. However, if, for example, PD equals 2, this means that the first two conducted 
changes cannot be reversed again and keep their state for the rest of the simulation. Due 
to this path dependency through irreversible actions, firms can find themselves “locked-
in” and not reaching any peak of an environment. 
In sum, our model extends the standard NK model as used in previous research. We 
include response uncertainty in the evaluation of fitness values by means of the 
parameters E and D, and incorporate irreversible actions via the parameter PD. Thus, the 
model allows the investigation of response uncertainty, complexity, and path dependence 
in the context of disruption recovery. 
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4.3.7 Results 
The goal of our simulation experiments is to analyze the conditions under which a firm 
should decide to delay the initial recovery decision to a point where more accurate 
information has been accumulated. We generate two firms (agents) with identical initial 
configurations d (without loss of generality) at the beginning of each individual 
simulation run of 80 periods of time (T). Both firms face six decisions (N = 6) and operate 
in the same environment with either low (Klow = 1) or high complexity (Khigh = 5). This 
environment is stable until it is disrupted in period 40. The disruption results in an 
environmental change and the firms’ environment is replaced by a randomly generated 
new one. The parameters N and K are not altered by the disruption. Subsequently, one 
firm applies purely RAF to eliminate response uncertainty before it takes action, while 
the other applies purely RFA facing distorted fitness values to a pre-defined degree E for 
a certain number of time periods D. Furthermore, a certain number of the firms’ first 
alterations PD is irreversible. 
By varying the four parameters K, D, E, and PD, the simulation model enables 
sophisticated analyses under a variety of conditions. We focus on parameter values that 
create diverse settings to derive the implications of RAF and RFA for the recovery 
performance of firms. The parameter values used in the simulation experiments are 
depicted in Table 11. 
Given this setup, we compare the average recovery performance of RAF and RFA 
in different settings of our simulation experiments based on four measures which address 
two main dimensions: Effectiveness and speed. The performance measures we report 
constitute averages of 10,000 runs to eliminate the stochastic component that any single 
run is sensitive to. 8 
Effectiveness. The effectiveness of a firm’s recovery efforts is a relevant 
performance indicator, because it reflects the extent to which negative effects on firm 
performance have been minimized (Bode et al., 2011; Handfield et al., 2007). We 
                                                          
8 Two additional performance measures – “average first improvement” and “alterations required to recover” 
– were scrutinized, but did not reveal interesting results beyond the rather obvious insight that RAF always 
leads to more precise initial actions and requires less changes to recover from disruptions than RFA. For 
the rest of this paper, we focus on measures that identify different dominant strategies depending on the 
environmental conditions. Since the degree of complexity influences the absolute levels of fitness in NK 
landscapes, we measure fitness values in relation to the global optimum of an environment (Skellett, 
Cairns, Geard, Tonkes, & Wiles, 2005). 
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construct two effectiveness-related performance measures: Post-disruption performance 
(PDP) and final performance (FP). 
Speed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the speed of completing the recovery 
reduces costs and losses. For example, Macdonald and Corsi (2013) argued that “the 
longer it takes to fully recover, the more expensive the entire recovery process is likely 
to be” (p. 272). Two measures are used to capture speed: Uncertainty resolution 
performance (URP) and number of time periods (NTP). Whenever we report that one 
response strategy (RAF/ RFA) performs better than the other, the difference in mean 
performance is statistically significant with p < 0.05 or better. 
Table 11: Parameter values determining the experimental conditions 
(1) Number of decisions (N), one value 
(i) N = 6 
(2) Complexity (K), two values 
(i) Low: Klow = 1 
(ii) High: Khigh = 5 
(3) Duration of response uncertainty (D), in time periods, two values 
(i) Short: Dshort = 5 
(ii) Long: Dlong = 10 
(4) Response uncertainty (E), in standard deviations of an environment’s fitness values, three values 
(i) Low: Elow = 0.5 
(ii) Medium: Emedium = 1 
(iii) High: Ehigh = 2 
(5) Path dependence (PD), in decisions, two values 
(i) None: PDnone = 0 
(ii) Strong: PDstrong = 4 
Figure 9 summarizes the conditions under which a certain response strategy 
dominates the other on a given performance dimension (effectiveness or speed). 
Managers should be aware that RAF is more precise in the first period of search and 
requires less alteration and related investment to find a long-term configuration than RFA 
in all depicted settings. However, from interviews with procurement executives that we 
conducted as part of this study, the perception that, in case of a supply disruption, costs 
are regarded as “necessary evil” became apparent, because the goal of a recovery process 
is “to maintain the supply of customers, whatever the cost.” 
Post-Disruption Performance (PDP). In our simulation, the PDP is the average 
fitness value of a firm from period 40 to the end of the simulation run. It demonstrates the 
extent to which negative disruption effects have been minimized. Figure 10 depicts the 
PDPs of RAF and RFA under various conditions. 
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Figure 9: Summary of results 
 
Note. The results at the bottom of the tree indicate which strategy (RAF or RFA) is superior in terms of the performance dimensions effectiveness (PDP and FP) and 
speed (URP and NTP) given the specific parameter configurations. A strategy is superior in a given performance dimension if at least one of both KPIs (PDP and FP for 
effectiveness, URP and NTP for speed) reflects a better performance while the strategy does not perform weaker in the other KPI. Blank cells (white background, filled 
with “–“) indicate that a superior strategy cannot be determined based on the simulation experiments. 
(a) “no” refers to no path dependence (PDnone), “stg” refers to strong path dependence (PDstrong). 
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Figure 10: Post-disruption performance (PDP) 
  
  
The complexity of the respective environments is indicated as either low (Klow = 1) 
or high (Khigh = 5). The diagrams’ x-axes depict three levels of response uncertainty: Low 
(Elow = 0.5), medium (Emedium = 1), and high (Ehigh = 2). Disruptions can either be followed 
by a short (Dshort = 5) or long (Dlong = 10) period of uncertainty and decisions are either 
reversible (PDnone = 0) or the first four altered decisions are irreversible (PDstrong = 4). For 
each possible combination of D and PD, one of the four diagrams shown in Figure 10 
depicts the average PDP of RAF and RFA on the y-axis. Every diagram comprises four 
lines. The dotted lines refer to RFA and the solid lines to RAF. This basic structure for 
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the presentation of the simulation results remains the same for all figures which are used 
in the results section hereafter. 
The results shown in Figure 10 provide several interesting insights. If response 
uncertainty is low, RFA dominates RAF in all settings with respect to PDP. Furthermore, 
in highly complex environments, this performance advantage of RFA extends to medium 
response uncertainty. In highly complex environments where actions are reversible, RFA 
outperforms RAF, regardless of the level and duration of response uncertainty (D). 
However, the advantage of RFA is reduced by increasing path dependence (PD). In highly 
complex environments where actions are irreversible, strong path dependence 
accompanied by high response uncertainty results in RAF achieving a greater or at least 
equal PDP compared to RFA. In environments with low complexity and high response 
uncertainty, RAF dominates RFA, regardless of the intensity of path dependence. If we 
focus on the implications for complex landscapes (given the premise that most firms 
operate in complex supply chains and environments), these insights lead to the following 
propositions: 
Proposition 1. If the environment is highly complex and actions are reversible, then 
PDPRFA > PDPRAF. 
Proposition 2. If the environment is highly complex, actions are irreversible, and 
response uncertainty is low or medium, then PDPRFA > PDPRAF. 
Final Performance (FP). The aim of disruption response is to restore desired 
performance levels and a firm’s ability to do this is depicted by the fitness level of its 
long-term configuration (FP). To this end, we examine the final fitness values (period 80) 
of RAF and RFA. Figure 11 reveals that in environments with low complexity, 
irreversibility of actions leads to greater or at least equal final fitness values for RAF 
compared to RFA. RAF’s performance advantage increases with the level of uncertainty. 
However, if actions are reversible, RFA leads to greater or at least equal final fitness 
values compared to RAF in all settings. In highly complex environments, this advantage 
of RFA increases with the level and duration of response uncertainty. However, if 
decisions in highly complex environments are irreversible, RAF outperforms RFA if 
response uncertainty is high. Hence: 
Proposition 3. If actions are reversible, then FPRFA ≥ FPRAF. 
Proposition 4. If the environment is highly complex and actions are reversible, then 
FPRFA increases with the level and the duration of response 
uncertainty. 
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Proposition 5. If the environment is highly complex, actions are irreversible, and 
response uncertainty is high, then FPRAF > FPRFA. 
Figure 11: Final performance (FP) 
  
  
Uncertainty Resolution Performance (URP). URP depicts how quickly firms have 
been able to minimize the negative effects of a disruption on their performance (fitness 
value) at the point of time where response uncertainty has completely been resolved (either 
period 46 or 51). From then on, the firms face undistorted fitness values. 
Figure 12 shows the URPs observed in our simulation experiments. One of the main 
insights from Figure 12 is that in highly complex environments RFA leads to a greater 
(or at least equal) URP than RAF if response uncertainty is low or medium. In highly 
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complex environments with high and long-lasting response uncertainty, RAF leads to a 
greater URP than RFA. When response uncertainty is low or medium and short-lived, 
RFA achieves a better URP than RAF, independent of the complexity of the firms’ 
environment or the intensity of path dependence. Accordingly, we propose the following: 
Proposition 6. If the environment is highly complex and response uncertainty is low 
or medium, then URPRFA ≥ URPRAF. 
Figure 12: Uncertainty resolution performance (URP) 
  
  
Number of Time Periods Required to Reach the Long-Term Configuration 
(NTP). As a further measure of recovery process speed, we investigate how quickly firms 
recover. 
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Figure 13: Number of time periods required to reach long-term configuration (NTP) 
  
  
To this end, the average number of time periods needed to reach a stable long-term 
configuration is calculated. Figure 13 depicts the NTP that firms applying one of the 
response strategies require to find their long-term configuration, subsequent to a supply 
disruption. In settings where actions are reversible and response uncertainty is long-
lasting, RAF will be faster than (or at least as fast) RFA in reaching the long-term 
solution. However, if actions are irreversible, RFA leads to a more quickly completed 
recovery if response uncertainty is only low or medium and short-lived. This leads to the 
following and last propositions: 
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Proposition 7. If actions are irreversible and response uncertainty is neither high 
nor long-lasting, then NTPRFA < NTPRAF. 
Proposition 8. If actions are reversible and response uncertainty is medium or high, 
then NTPRAF < NTPRFA. 
4.3.8 Robustness of simulation results 
To ensure that the results obtained were not due to chance, we performed several checks 
in congruence with previous studies using the NK model. First, the representativeness of 
the results was ensured by conducting 10,000 replications for every combination of K, D, 
E, and PD to eliminate the influence of random fluctuations in the generation of firms 
and environments. Every time we report a performance difference between the two 
response strategies, this difference in means is statistically significant with p < 0.05 or 
better. Second, we systematically varied all of the model parameters. To be as clear and 
concise as possible, we have presented only a subset of the results of all these simulation 
experiments. We focused on polar types of parameter values to be able to identify a 
parameter’s influence. Although the precise quantitative outcomes change, the qualitative 
patterns can also be observed with intermediate values of the model parameters K, D, E, 
and PD. We find that most of the results that we report for highly complex environments 
(see P1, P4, P5, and P6) also hold if K equals 4. All other results hold for all values of K. 
Furthermore, the results we report for settings with irreversible actions (see P2, P5, and 
P7) hold for values of PD > 0. Increasing the number of decisions N does not qualitatively 
change the results. Third, the results are not sensitive to the assumption of similar initial 
configurations for the two agents in every simulation run. The same qualitative patterns 
also result from unequal initial configurations. 
4.3.9 Discussion 
By means of simulation experiments, we investigated under which conditions managers 
should delay their response actions until they have acquired more evidence on the 
consequences of response actions. The propositions derived are robust in many regards 
and yield several general insights. In the following, we focus on the insights generated 
for highly complex environments. We assume them to resemble today’s business 
environments more accurately than less complex environments. 
First, an immediate response to supply disruptions is beneficial for the average post-
disruption performance even if the consequences of response actions cannot be 
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determined precisely. This holds true even if more than half of the decisions are 
irreversible and response uncertainty is long-lasting. Only if the latter becomes very high 
so that managers are virtually “poking around in the dark”, firms should delay action until 
further information has been collected. 
Second, the choice of a response strategy significantly affects the average long-term 
performance of firms. Moreover, if actions are reversible, firms pursuing RFA benefit 
from a high level of response uncertainty. This seems to be quite counterintuitive. 
However, one explanation for this result might be that high levels of response uncertainty 
drive exploration and testing of configurations which may turn out to be detrimental in 
the short-run but enable firms to achieve superior performance in the long-run. Hence, 
early decisions with an adverse effect on a firm’s performance can provide an opportunity 
for future local improvements if actions are reversible. If detrimental initial decisions 
cannot be reversed, they pose a burden that a firm cannot recover from. 
Third, although immediate action subsequent to a supply disruption requires more 
changes to find a stable long-term configuration, firms recover more quickly if response 
uncertainty is neither high nor long-lasting. This means that if firms are capable of quickly 
improving their ability to predict the consequences of their response actions, they benefit 
from a quick reaction and recover faster than competitors that might delay action to spend 
further resources on information collection. 
4.4 How managers actually intend to behave in supply 
disruption response situations 
To complement the findings from the simulation experiments, we use a vignette-based 
experimental methodology to analyze the behavior of managers in disruption recovery 
processes in business-to-business (B2B) contexts. Vignette-based experiments offer 
several methodological advantages which fit our specific research context. First, they 
provide controlled tests of causal relationships by carefully manipulating vignettes that 
are presented to the participants. Second, in comparison to rather retrospective studies 
based on surveys or case studies, the use of vignette-based experiments can generate more 
reliable data on respondent behavior, because participants have to indicate their intentions 
shortly after reading a specific scenario to minimize retrospective bias (Wathne et al., 
2001). Third, an experimental design enables researchers to study behavior and choices 
where individuals or firms are usually not likely to share information (Rungtusanatham 
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et al., 2011). A supply chain disruption, which is our studied context, is typically 
accompanied by adverse effects on firms. Furthermore, severe incidents are rather rare 
and it would be unethical to actually disrupt a firm to collect data. Vignette-based 
experiments help to overcome both issues. 
A vignette is defined as “short, carefully constructed description of a person, object, 
or situation, representing a systematic combination of characteristics” (Atzmüller & 
Steiner, 2010, p. 128). In our experiment, we integrate vignettes into a survey, since this 
is a promising but rarely applied approach to study respondents’ judgments and account 
for each approach’s shortcoming. By randomly assigning participants to treatment cells 
we eliminate systematic differences in the participants that might affect their responses 
(e.g., Bachrach & Bendoly, 2011). Hence, differences in response behavior can be 
attributed to the manipulated experimental treatments. This methodological approach has 
recently been employed in the field of operations management to study “chain liability” 
(Hartmann & Moeller, 2014), make-or-buy decisions (Mantel et al., 2006), observational 
learning (Hora & Klassen, 2013), and perceptual differences between buyers and 
suppliers (Ro et al., 2016). 
4.4.1 Development of the vignettes 
A key aspect of vignette-based experiments is the vignette design and validation. We 
carefully constructed vignettes that assigned participants to the role of a procurement 
manager that faces a supply disruption and considers to take immediate action to mitigate 
its negative consequences. We followed the principle of form postponement, hence, all 
vignettes began with an introductory common module that was the same for all 
participants to ensure the provision of a similar contextual background (Aguinis & 
Bradley, 2014; Rungtusanatham et al., 2011). Our three factors of interest, response 
uncertainty, complexity, and path dependence, were manipulated in a subsequent 
experimental cues module. We developed a scenario of a supply disruption involving a 
supplier that is unable to ramp up production and deliver large enough amounts of its 
product (electric engines) as an example of a disruption that frequently occurs in practice 
(e.g., Hepher & Altmeyer, 2017; D. Wu & Ting-Fang, 2017). All other factors of the 
vignettes were held constant. 
Our factors of interest were manipulated in line with the parameters and their levels 
shaping the model developed in the third section to be able to depict comparable 
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scenarios. To maintain an adequate degree of complexity for the participants, we 
restricted the experiment to a static one-shot decision, focused on low and high levels of 
response uncertainty, and abstained from including duration of response uncertainty as a 
further factor. In total, using a 2 (response uncertainty: Low or high) x 2 (complexity: 
Low or high) x 2 (path dependence: None or strong) full factorial design, we created eight 
vignettes. After reading a vignette, participants were asked to imagine themselves in the 
role of the procurement manager in the described scenario and indicate their willingness 
to take immediate action. We utilized a form of indirect questioning (projective 
technique) to limit potential demand characteristics and effects of social desirability 
(Thomas et al., 2013). In addition, respondents were supposed to report their risk attitude. 
In order to measure the latter, we employed the general risk question (Dohmen et al., 
2011) which is widely used and requires participants to rate their individual willingness 
to take risks on a 11-point Likert-type scale. It has been shown to be a very good predictor 
of risk-related behavior. 
Two different levels of response uncertainty were described by varying how 
uncertain it was that the proposed action positively influenced the depicted supply 
disruption’s negative consequences. It was either quite certain (low) or very uncertain 
(high) that the consequences of taking action could be predicted. Complexity was varied 
by manipulating the independence of the decision. In the low complexity setting, the 
decision needed to be taken in a slightly complex environment with minor impact on other 
internal processes and its success was almost independent of the actions of colleagues. In 
the high complexity setting, the decision needed to be taken in a very complex 
environment with a very large impact on other internal processes and its success was very 
much dependent on the actions of colleagues. Path dependence was manipulated by 
varying the extent to which future options were limited by the decision to immediately 
act or not. They were either not (none) or heavily (strong) limited. 
As recommended by Wason et al. (2002), the vignettes were pre-tested with 85 
students that were randomly assigned to one of the eight treatment condition to assess the 
vignettes’ validity, internal consistency, and realism. After reading the vignettes, students 
were asked to indicate their willingness to act and responded to manipulation checks to 
ensure that different levels of the independent variables were appropriately represented. 
Average responses for complexity and path dependence were significantly different 
between low and high treatment groups. We included three levels of response uncertainty 
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in our pretest (Low, medium, and high), however, there were no significant differences 
between medium and high response uncertainty. In order to address this shortcoming and 
reduce the complexity for our participants, we focused on low and high levels of response 
uncertainty in the final experiment. The students also rated the realism for the scenario 
description on a seven-point scale (1 = “not at all” to 7 = “totally”). The vignettes 
appeared realistic with mean responses ranging from 4.50 to 6.29 (grand mean is 5.61). 
4.4.2 Study participants 
Data were collected by means of a self-administered online experiment. Between June 
and September 2017, 1056 managers with direct experience in supply chain management 
from Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, have been invited to participate in our 
experiment. Contact addresses were obtained from a commercial business data provider. 
The managers received an invitation via e-mail and were randomly assigned to one of the 
eight treatment conditions. 112 of them completed the experiment, resulting in an 
effective response rate of 10.61%. On average, participants had almost 18 years of 
experience in supply chain management (SD = 10.33). Two observations were dropped 
due to outlier analysis, resulting in 110 usable vignettes.  
4.4.3 Dependent variable 
By means of our vignette experiments, we aim to reveal how response uncertainty, 
complexity, and path dependence affect the intentions of managers to take immediate 
action in response to supply disruptions. The decision to take immediate action can be 
seen as being binary, however, binary outcomes provide only little variance to explain 
and understand the effects of response uncertainty, complexity, and path dependence on 
such decisions. We follow McKelvie et al. (2011) and Cantor, Blackhurst, and Cortes 
(2014) by operationalizing our dependent variable as the participant’s intention to take 
immediate action (ITA), on a nine-point scale (anchored at 1 := “not at all likely” to 9 := 
“totally likely”). The specific action to be considered is described in detail in each 
vignette. 
4.4.4 Manipulation checks 
As in the pre-test, we verified that each participant perceived differences in our 
manipulations of the independent variables, as intended. To this end, all participants were 
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asked to respond to several manipulation checks, on seven-point scales (1 := “not at all” 
to 7 := “totally”), after reading and responding to a vignette. To assess the perceived level 
of response uncertainty, participants were asked to indicate to which extent they agree 
that the consequences of the proposed action were very uncertain. The respondents’ 
perception of low and high levels of response uncertainty were significantly different 
(Mlow = 2.61, Mhigh = 5.92; t(108), p < 0.001). To validate the manipulation of complexity, 
we asked participants to evaluate whether the decision had to be taken in a very complex 
environment. The participants’ responses were significantly different for low and high 
levels of complexity (Mlow = 1.85, Mhigh = 6.04; t(108), p < 0.001). Finally, to check 
whether the two levels of path dependence were perceived to be different, participants 
rated to which extent they agree that the depicted decision limited future opportunities to 
a very large extent. Respondents reported higher degrees of agreement when path 
dependence was strong compared to when it was absent (Mnone = 2.17, Mstrong = 5.49; 
t(108), p < 0.001). 
4.4.5 Results 
We relied on analysis of variance (ANOVA) to dissect our participants’ intentions. 
Parametric tests (e.g., ANOVA) are appropriate and robust for Likert-type data and can 
be used with “small sample sizes, with unequal variances, and with non-normal 
distributions, with no fear of ‘coming to the wrong conclusion’” (Norman, 2010, p. 631). 
A three-way ANOVA with response uncertainty (low or high), complexity (low or high), 
and path dependence (none or strong) as between-subjects factors and ITA as dependent 
variable was conducted. Table 12 contains information on the number of participants per 
cell, cell means, and corresponding standard deviations for our dependent variable ITA. 
The results revealed significant main effects of response uncertainty (F = 25.07, p 
< 0.001), complexity (F = 17.19, p < 0.001), and path dependence (F = 4.77, p = 0.03) on 
ITA. Low response uncertainty led to higher levels of ITA (Mlow = 5.02, SD = 2.60) than 
high response uncertainty (Mhigh = 2.94, SD = 1.91). The low complexity treatment 
revealed higher levels of ITA (Mlow = 5.00, SD = 2.46) than the high complexity treatment 
(Mhigh = 3.14, SD = 2.24). Finally, the absence of path dependence resulted in a higher 
willingness to take immediate action (Mnone = 4.58, SD = 2.53) than its presence (Mstrong 
= 3.56, SD = 2.43). No statistically significant interaction effects between these three 
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variables were identified. ANOVA results are provided in Table 13 and Figure 14 depicts 
the analyzed main effects. 
Table 12: Frequencies, cell means, and standard distributions for ITA 
Experimental condition 
Intention to take 
immediate action (ITA) Number of 
observations 
(n = 110) Path 
dependence 
Complexity 
Response 
uncertainty 
M SD 
None 
Low 
Low 6.88 1.75 16 
High 3.92 2.02 12 
High 
Low 4.33 2.61 12 
High 2.62 1.50 13 
Strong 
Low 
Low 5.29 2.09 14 
High 3.25 2.42 12 
High 
Low 3.53 2.67 17 
High 2.14 1.35 14 
Table 13: ANOVA results 
Source Partial SS df MS F p-value  
Response uncertainty 110.96 1 110.96 25.07 0.000 *** 
Complexity 76.09 1 76.09 17.19 0.000 *** 
Path dependence 21.11 1 21.11 4.77 0.031 * 
Response uncertainty × Complexity 6.04 1 6.04 1.36 0.246  
Response uncertainty × Path dependence 2.66 1 2.66 0.60 0.440  
Complexity × Path dependence 1.62 1 1.62 0.37 0.546  
Response uncertainty × Complexity × Path dependence 0.59 1 0.59 0.13 0.716  
Model 240.21 7 34.32 7.75 0.000 *** 
Residual 451.47 102 4.43    
Note. n = 110. The dependent variable is “intention to take immediate action” (ITA). SS refers to “sum of 
squares” (Type III), df to “degrees of freedom”, and MS to “mean square”. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
To examine the robustness of our findings and to ensure that the participants’ 
intentions were not determined by their experience and risk attitude, we included both 
variables as covariates in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with ITA as dependent 
variable and response uncertainty, complexity, and path dependence as independent 
variables. Neither the experience nor the risk attitude of the participating individuals had 
a statistically significant influence on ITA. Hence, the predicted effects remained 
qualitatively similar. 
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Figure 14: The effects of response uncertainty, complexity, and path dependence on 
ITA 
  
4.4.6 Discussion 
The depicted results provide insights into the intentions of managers to take immediate 
action after being hit by a supply disruption. The carefully designed vignette experiment 
reveals that the main parameters of our supply disruption recovery model, namely 
response uncertainty, complexity, and path dependence, considerably affect actual 
decision making within disruption management. Furthermore, we find that the effects of 
these influencing factors on managers’ willingness to take immediate action do not 
interact with each other which enables straightforward interpretation. 
More specifically, we demonstrate that, as response uncertainty and path 
dependence increase, managers are less willing to take immediate action. This means that, 
with regard to these two influencing factors, managers’ intentions basically correspond 
with how they should behave according to the simulation experiments. However, the 
results also demonstrate that higher levels of complexity seem to inhibit quick responses, 
which contradicts the insights drawn from the simulation experiments. The latter suggest 
that, as complexity increases, immediate action becomes more beneficial and should be 
preferred to delaying action if response uncertainty is not high. In contrast, our 
participants generally reveal lower levels of their willingness to take immediate action. 
This is in line with prior research, which states that decision makers will prefer to delay 
action, seek new alternatives, or revert to the status quo as the choice environment 
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becomes complex (Dhar, 1997). However, we thereby identify and provide empirical 
support for an important mismatch between how managers should behave and how they 
actually intend to act. 
4.5 General discussion 
Recovering from supply disruptions is a challenging task for the responsible managers. 
Typically, the subsequent decision making process is characterized by response 
uncertainty, complexity, and path dependence. Response uncertainty results from a lack 
of being able to precisely predict the consequences of response alternatives, complexity 
is driven by interactions among decisions, and path dependence stems from considerable 
expenditures required to change the operational setting of a firm. Against this backdrop, 
our multi-method study contributes to the emerging literature on supply disruption 
management by (1) providing insights into disruption recovery processes, (2) clearly 
defining RAF and RFA and delineating their implications for the recovery performance 
of firms by providing testable propositions, (3) revealing actual intentions of managers 
regarding their willingness to take immediate action in response to supply disruptions, 
and (4) considering distorted performance evaluations in the NK model by incorporating 
uncertainty. 
4.5.1 Implications for research 
This research analyzes the conditions under which a firm should decide to delay the initial 
recovery action to a point where more accurate information has been accumulated and 
investigates how managers actually intend to act. In this context, we have identified two 
archetypical approaches of organizational decision making: RAF and RFA. The former 
characterizes firms that tend to collect further information before taking action in the 
hopes of being able to make better informed decisions by eliminating response 
uncertainty. This means that analysis precedes and enables action. Thus, RAF resembles 
the rather rational approach to problem solving, similar to what one of the procurement 
executives that we interviewed explained: “Discovery, then we collected information. 
[…] Then you consider, what can you do? You develop options and alternatives. 
Afterwards you try to decide which one can be applied. Then, implementation and 
monitoring.” 
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RFA represents firms that respond immediately to a supply disruption, even if 
response uncertainty is present. Procurement executives stated the following when asked 
about their response to supply disruptions: “We immediately started bottleneck-
management, before we exactly knew how the situation really is”, “acting started 
immediately after the discovery”, and that they “did not initially build large teams to 
discuss it, we rather needed to act very quickly.” Based on imprecise or incomplete 
information on the consequences of response alternatives, they took action to be able to 
observe results that enable further adjustment. One respondent described such a process: 
“We tried to find short-term solutions first. We took action and when we […] did not 
reach the performance that was supposed to be reached, we decided to take another 
path.” Following Weick’s (1979) idea, these firms emphasize the use of action to make 
sense of observable outcomes. Thus, action is assumed to clarify the situation and create 
meaningful insights to guide and enable subsequent decisions. 
Table 14: Summary of propositions 
P1 If the environment is highly complex and actions are reversible, then PDPRFA > PDPRAF. 
P2 
If the environment is highly complex, actions are irreversible, and response uncertainty is low or 
medium, then PDPRFA > PDPRAF. 
P3 If actions are reversible, then FPRFA ≥ FPRAF. 
P4 
If the environment is highly complex and actions are reversible, then FPRFA increases with the 
level and the duration of response uncertainty. 
P5 
If the environment is highly complex, actions are irreversible, and response uncertainty is high, 
then FPRAF > FPRFA. 
P6 
If the environment is highly complex and response uncertainty is low or medium, then URPRFA ≥ 
URPRAF. 
P7 
If actions are irreversible and response uncertainty is neither high nor long-lasting, then NTPRFA 
< NTPRAF. 
P8 If actions are reversible and response uncertainty is medium or high, then NTPRAF < NTPRFA. 
Different authors have advocated either RAF (e.g., Kepner & Tregoe, 1965) or RFA 
(e.g., Peters & Waterman, 1982), but the implications of both approaches on a firm’s 
disruption recovery performance in complex settings accompanied by response 
uncertainty and path dependence have not yet been examined. The findings of our 
simulation experiments, summarized in eight testable propositions shown in Table 14, 
address this important research gap. Obviously, firms that apply RFA are exposed to the 
risk of erroneously altering their operating procedures in the belief that the change will 
lead to better firm performance. Although the expected performance of an alternative 
configuration might be greater than the performance of the current configuration, the true 
performance might be reduced, because the performance values of alternative 
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configurations are distorted by response uncertainty in the early stages of a recovery 
process. 
In line with the insights provided in the third section, we furthermore demonstrate 
that response uncertainty and path dependence reduce the actual willingness of managers 
to take immediate action. However, higher levels of complexity have a similar effect, 
although managers should actually respond quickly to supply disruptions in complex 
environment if response uncertainty is not high. This circumstance illustrates a 
considerable mismatch between managers’ intentions and their optimal behavior 
according to our findings. Moreover, we do not find evidence for an action bias in post 
supply disruption decision making (Bar-Eli, Azar, Ritov, Keidar-Levin, & Schein, 2007). 
On the contrary, managers react sensitively to high levels of response uncertainty, 
complexity, and path dependence and reduce their willingness to take immediate action. 
4.5.2 Implications for practice 
In addition to the theoretical implications discussed above, the results of our research also 
have important implications for practice. Managers responding to supply disruptions need 
to be aware of the conditions that characterize their environment. The level of response 
uncertainty that firms face considerably affects the ramifications of delaying action or 
immediately responding to a supply disruption. In complex environments, only if 
response uncertainty is perceived to be high and long-lasting, waiting for more 
information can be advisable, based on our results. Furthermore, managers are required 
to trade off the accuracy of their actions against the speed of their reaction. On the one 
hand, delaying a response results in more precise first improvements and requires less 
changes to be made. On the other hand, immediate responses on average result in quicker 
recovery of firm performance. Moreover, the long-term performance of firms is, on 
average, not weakened but rather strengthened by response uncertainty if detrimental 
decisions can be reversed. In complex environments, firms may also benefit from quick 
responses in the short run and may increase their market share as Nokia did in did in the 
aftermath of the aforementioned disruption. 
Furthermore, previous research on decision making behavior highlighted the 
influence of cognitive biases on the decision to act or not to act. Managers should be 
aware of these biases to avoid being misled in their decision of when to respond to a 
supply disruption. Some decision makers tend to be biased towards analysis (Kerstholt, 
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1996). A tendency for RAF can, for example, even be fostered by a status-quo bias 
(Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). This bias represents the tendency in human decision 
making under uncertainty to value the current state more than a potentially superior but 
uncertain alternative. In the worst case, this may lead to the phenomenon of analysis 
paralysis meaning that action is delayed further and further. Similarly, a tendency for 
RFA is intensified by an action bias. If managers take action, “at least they will be able 
to say that they tried to do something” (Bar-Eli et al., 2007, p. 616). Furthermore, action 
is considered more appropriate than inaction in response to bad performance (Zeelenberg, 
Van den Bos, Van Dijk, & Pieters, 2002). Hence, taking action might often appear to be 
an attractive option for managers although they should rather delay a response. 
Surprisingly, based on the results of the vignette-based experiments, we are able to 
demonstrate that managers tend to refrain from taking immediate action if the degree of 
either response uncertainty, complexity, or path dependence increase. However, 
managers should rather take immediate action in complex environments, as delineated by 
our simulation experiments. This incongruity has important practical implications for the 
management of supply disruptions. Managers seem not to be aware of the benefits 
associated with quick responses in complex decision making environments and should 
demonstrate a higher willingness to take immediate action when exposed to complexity. 
4.5.3 Limitations and future research opportunities 
The contribution of this research is constrained by several limitations. As a main 
assumption of the NK model and the model developed in the third section, each decision 
i is assumed to interact with exactly the same number of decisions as every other decision. 
Nevertheless, some decisions might actually interact with more of the other decisions than 
others do. Furthermore, we have limited our model to decision makers with centralized 
authority, because we assumed that this is a basic characteristic of disruption management 
processes. We did not consider many factors that might also characterize organizational 
search processes such as the presence of a hierarchy (Mihm et al., 2010) and the need to 
coordinate (Lounamaa & March, 1987). In addition, we assumed that a supply disruption 
does not change the underlying complexity of an environment. However, it might be 
possible that a severe supply disruption alters the level of interaction between the 
operational activities of a firm. Another limitation concerns our conceptualization of 
performance. Although we refer to a firm’s operating performance as main determinant 
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of a firm’s recovery efforts, our model’s measure of operating performance is abstract 
rather than specific. 
Moreover, although complementing the simulation experiments, the vignette-based 
experiments introduces further limitations. First and foremost, the participants were 
exposed to vignettes containing information about a specific one-shot supply disruption 
situation. In real disruption recovery processes, subjects are likely to receive such 
information in a more fragmented fashion, perhaps over multiple time periods. In order 
to reduce the complexity of the decision making task for our respondents, we refrained 
from a multi-stage setting taking, e.g., the duration of response uncertainty into account. 
Thus, research accounting for the dynamics of disruption recovery processes would add 
to the validity and generalizability of our findings. In addition, we rely on the intentions 
of managers instead of their actual behavior. However, prior research shows that 
intentions may serve as reliable indicators of actual behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; T. L. 
Webb & Sheeran, 2006). 
Finally, our work suggests several opportunities for further research. The delineated 
and defined disruption response strategies RAF and RFA could be empirically 
investigated through large-scale studies or further (dynamic) experiments. The developed 
propositions could be used to derive testable hypotheses on the performance of RAF and 
RFA. Moreover, our research indicates that the use of the NK model can provide rich 
insights into the management of supply disruptions. The NK framework will remain a 
powerful tool to analyze organizational decision making under complexity that does not 
allow for analytical optimization. Future research could build on our suggestions on how 
to represent supply disruption recovery and apply the NK model methodology to further 
research questions of the field by adjusting or extending our model. In addition, our 
research demonstrates the importance and relevance of behavioral aspects in the supply 
(chain) disruption context and the need to further investigate disruption management 
processes, typically characterized by limited time and unreliable or sparse information. 
Therefore, we hope that this work encourages further research on supply disruption 
management. Given the fact that firms will most likely never be able to fully control their 
environment and perfectly predict changes, managers will continue to face severe supply 
disruptions and require additional insights on how best to respond to them. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and future research 
directions 
This chapter summarizes the research delineated in the previous chapters and highlights 
the main answers to the research questions formulated in Chapter 1. In addition, the main 
limitations of this dissertation research and avenues for future research are discussed. 
5.1 Summary 
The extant research has focused on supply risk and disruption management from a firm 
perspective, however, a firm’s responsible decision makers play a key role in addressing 
supply risk and disruptions. In the first chapter of this dissertation, three important but yet 
unclear behavioral issues have been identified in this context. They have been addressed 
by the studies presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Their results are summarized in the 
following. 
5.1.1 Research question 1: Supply risk management 
The increasing complexity and interconnectedness of modern supply chains have added 
to the vulnerability of many firms to suffer from supply disruptions. Although most 
supply chain managers are well-aware of their potentially severe negative consequences, 
recent major disruptions have revealed that many supply chain managers prove 
unprepared to effectively recover their firms’ operational performance (A.T. Kearney & 
RapidRatings, 2018). Given that there is a need to better understand why some managers 
proactively prepare for supply disruptions and others do not, Research Question 1 was 
formulated. 
To provide answers to Research Question 1, the research presented in Chapter 2 
builds on PMT and its underlying idea of cognitive appraisal processes that determine an 
individual’s intention to adopt a specific proactive measure. In addition, based on a 
framework delineating key antecedents of proactive work behavior developed by Frese 
and Fay (2001), this research accounts for the effects of certain individual-specific factors 
on proactivity. By means of a carefully designed DCE, empirical data were collected to 
explore the choice behavior of supply chain managers in the context of supply risk 
management and evaluate the developed propositions. The data enabled an assessment of 
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the relative importance of certain proactive action attributes and a comparison of choice 
behavior with the perceptions of the participants.  
In line with the coping appraisal process of PMT, the DCE explored the relative 
importance of (1) a specific proactive measure’s effectiveness (response efficacy), (2) an 
individual’s ability to successfully implement the measure (self-efficacy), and (3) the 
costs associated with pursuing the proactive measure (response costs). An analysis of the 
results showed that all of these factors have significantly influenced the probability to 
choose a specific proactive measure. Surprisingly, the effectiveness of a proactive 
measure emerged as least important factor. When selecting proactive measures, response 
costs (we distinguished between the following response costs: Direct implementation 
costs and negative side effects on the respective buyer-supplier relationship) were 
subconsciously given more importance than self-efficacy or response efficacy. However, 
high vulnerability to a supply disruption mitigated the relative importance of response 
costs. 
A comparison of the subconsciously assigned weights with the consciously rated 
perceived importance of these proactive action attributes unveiled a considerable 
mismatch between decision makers’ perceptions and their choice behavior in the context 
of supply risk management. While response efficacy was subconsciously assigned least 
importance in the DCE, it was prioritized over response costs and self-efficacy when the 
supply chain managers were asked to directly rate the relative importance of proactive 
action attributes. 
Further implications with regard to Research Question 1 were derived from the 
influence of individual-specific factors on choice behavior. An individual’s proactive 
personality, risk attitude, control appraisal, and experience had statistically significant 
effects on the relative importance of the included proactive action attributes. These effects 
shed light on what drives decision makers to or prevents them from selecting specific 
proactive actions and the related insights were incorporated into an enriched model of 
PMT that accounts for the influence of individual-specific factors on building protection 
motivation (see Figure 5). 
In sum, study 1 adds to a better understanding of why, in the supply risk context, 
some managers take proactive action while others do not. This is an important 
contribution as this is the first attempt to analyze choice behavior to derive insights into 
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proactive decision making in supply risk management. Moreover, several promising 
opportunities for future research have been identified and discussed. 
5.1.2 Research question 2: The influence of supply risk management on the impact 
of disruptions 
Although the topic of CSR has received considerable attention in business practice and 
research, it is often merely associated with “doing good” while “avoiding bad” and, more 
specifically, the issue of CSIR, have largely been neglected. In light of this, many firms 
engage in CSR in the hopes of “insurance-like” effects in case of environmental or social 
misconduct. However, the effects of ex ante CSR on negative stakeholder reactions 
subsequent to CSIR are not fully understood. Thus, study 2 in Chapter 3 was concerned 
with Research Question 2. 
Two conflicting perspectives on the effect of a firm’s prior CSR activities on 
negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR emanate from prior literature. On the one hand, 
some studies have theorized an insurance-like mechanism such that prior CSR 
engagement builds a “reservoir of goodwill” that mitigates negative responses to bad 
news (e.g., Flammer, 2013; Godfrey et al., 2009). On the other hand, additional research 
efforts conclude that firms which engage in CSR might create an expectation burden in 
case of severe CSIR since these firms are often criticized the most (e.g., Swaen & 
Vanhamme, 2003; Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009). To better understand whether these 
effects depend on CSIR severity and the CSR reputation’s nature, study 2 presents and 
discusses the results of a vignette-based experiment. 
These results provide further empirical support for the circumstance that insurance-
like effects of CSR do not always hold and contribute to specifying their relevant 
boundary conditions. Both CSIR severity and the CSR reputation’s nature (substantive/ 
symbolic) moderate the relationship between CSIR and negative stakeholder reactions. 
Based on study 2, it can be concluded that substantive CSR reputations provide insurance-
like benefits in case of less severe CSIR but do not seem to mitigate negative stakeholder 
reactions to severe CSIR. However, firms with reputations mainly driven by symbolic 
CSR also experience insurance-like effects in response to less severe CSIR, but are 
exposed to higher intentions to engage in nWOM after severe CSIR compared to firms 
that did not promote themselves as socially responsible. 
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Being the first study that explicitly addressed the role of ex ante CSR reputations 
on negative stakeholder reactions to CSIR in a B2B environment, the results contribute 
to an improved understanding of CSIR-related risk and disruption management. In 
addition, this study provides valuable empirical support for CSR engagement based on 
instrumental rather than moral motives. 
5.1.3 Research question 3: Supply disruption management 
Supply disruptions pose considerable challenges to managers that seek to recover from 
their negative consequences. After being exposed to supply disruptions, managers 
typically face unreliable information about the consequences of possible response actions. 
In this context, it is not trivial to decide on whether to wait until more reliable information 
are available or directly launch response actions. Hence, to gain a better understanding of 
how to effectively respond to supply disruptions, the research presented in Chapter 4 has 
addressed Research Question 3 by means of a multi-method approach. 
In a first step, simulation experiments with an agent-based model of supply 
disruption recovery revealed how managers should behave in response to supply 
disruptions. The model was developed based on complexity, response uncertainty, and 
path dependence as main determinants of a supply chain manager’s environment in the 
aftermath of a supply disruption. The results highlight that high complexity favors quick 
action to be able to make sense of observable outcomes, but if response uncertainty is 
high, more reliable information should be acquired before action is taken. Further key 
insights were summarized in eight testable propositions which provide promising 
opportunities for future research. 
In a second step, the actual willingness of managers to take immediate action 
subsequent to being affected by a supply disruption was explored. An analysis of data 
from vignette-based experiments showed that response uncertainty and path dependence 
reduced the participants’ intention to quickly respond to supply disruptions. Moreover, 
although managers should actually respond quickly to supply disruptions in highly 
complex environments if response uncertainty is not high, the results reveal that managers 
tend to refrain from a quick response in case of high complexity. Hence, the multi-method 
approach enabled the identification of a considerable mismatch between managers’ 
intentions and the recommended behavior based on the simulation experiments. Thereby, 
Study 3 contributes to the emerging literature on supply disruption recovery and adds to 
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a better understanding of decision making behavior in the context of supply disruption 
management. 
5.2 Limitations 
As with any empirical research, the results presented in this dissertation must be viewed 
in light of certain overarching limitations concerning the data and the research designs. 
First, the behavioral experiments conducted in Study 1 (discrete choice), Study 2 
(vignette-based), and Study 3 (vignette-based) rely on intentions instead of actual 
behavior as their outcome criteria. Stated intentions are considered the best predictors of 
actual behavior (Ajzen, 1991; T. L. Webb & Sheeran, 2006). However, research has 
shown that intentions are not perfectly correlated with future behavior, especially if there 
is a large time lapse between measuring intentions and behavior or if an individual is 
unable to act on an intention due to a lack of skills or unanticipated barriers (Fishbein, 
2008; Morwitz, 1997). Hence, replicating the experiments with actual behavior as 
outcome variable would enhance the explanatory power of the results presented. 
Second, this dissertation focusses on individuals with centralized decision making 
authority to investigate the behavior of purchasing professionals. Hence, the studies 
conducted did not account for certain characteristics of industrial buying situations such 
as hierarchical structures (W. J. Johnston & Bonoma, 1981), codes of conduct (Wotruba, 
Chonko, & Loe, 2001), and the need to coordinate with other functions (Kocabasoglu & 
Suresh, 2006). Thus, a worthwhile next step would be to develop research designs that 
incorporate these characteristics and more comprehensively examine decision making 
behavior in industrial buying situations. 
Finally, the experiments with purchasing professionals conducted in Study 1, Study 
2, and Study 3 mostly relied on respondents from German-speaking countries (Austria, 
Germany, and Switzerland) which have relatively similar cultures (Hofstede, 1984, 
2003). Their responses were treated as a single data set in the statistical analyses, since 
previous research did not indicate any differences among these countries. However, it has 
been shown that culture may influence behavior (e.g., Money et al., 1998). In addition, 
the frequency and severity of natural disasters in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland are 
very low compared to other countries or regions (e.g., Asia or the US) (Helferich & 
Robert, 2002) which may have repercussions on the behavior of purchasing professionals. 
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Hence, replicating the experiments conducted as part of this dissertation research with 
respondents from other cultural regions or from countries with different risk profiles 
would be a promising next step to disentangle the influence of culture and environmental 
conditions on choice behavior in the context of supply risks and supply disruptions. 
5.3 Outlook 
In addition to addressing the limitations mentioned above, several fruitful avenues for 
future research in the area of supply risks and disruptions emerge from this dissertation 
research. 
First, the model of supply disruption recovery presented in Study 3 could serve as 
a basis for further research on managing supply disruptions. Using an adjusted or 
extended version of the model might provide additional insights into decision making 
behavior of purchasing professionals. For example, although Study 3 focusses on whether 
to delay a response subsequent to supply disruptions, the model could be used to 
investigate the recovery performance implications of teams instead of single respondents 
or account for different organizational structures. Moreover, the simulation experiments 
in Study 3 have led to eight testable propositions which could be empirically investigated 
by means of large-scale studies or dynamic experiments. 
Second, although this dissertation provides important contributions to the academic 
discussion on behavioral issues of managing supply risks and disruptions, many relevant 
questions remain unanswered. Despite the growing scholarly interest in individual level 
behavior in the supply risk literature, research on behavioral aspects of managing supply 
risks and disruptions is still scant especially in light of the fact that coping with supply 
risks poses several managerial challenges. Study 1 has highlighted that certain individual-
specific factors affect proactive risk management decisions. However, it is likely that 
further personality-related factors, such as measures of ambition and extraversion, could 
also considerably impact the decisions of the responsible managers. In addition, the 
influence of an individual’s cultural background or organizational codes of conduct on 
the behavior of purchasing professionals remain largely unclear. Given that many firms 
have considerably increased their degree of globalization during the last decades and 
comprise a multi-cultural set of employees, these issues might have important 
repercussions on decision making in supply risk and disruption management. 
Conclusion and future research directions  100 
 
Finally, this dissertation research strongly relies on experiments as methodological 
approach to address the identified research questions. The studies’ results contribute 
valuable insights into the behavior of purchasing professionals and, hence, highlight the 
unique advantages of using experiments to study behavioral issues of supply risk and 
disruption management such as control, efficiency, and responsiveness (Siemsen, 2011). 
Nevertheless, supply chain researchers have only begun to exploit these benefits to, for 
instance, augment or weaken the confidence in the validity of a theory by complementing 
results of surveys or archival research with insights from behavioral experiments. Thus, 
a promising avenue for future research on behavioral issues in supply risk and disruption 
management is the intensified and innovative use of experiments. 
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